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CROSS-BORDER REINCORPORATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
THE CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE HARMONISATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. This paper compares the legal frameworks for corporate reincorporations of all EU 
Member States, relying on a Study prepared by the authors for the European Commission and 
accompanied by detailed national reports. It is shown that, despite recent decisions of the 
Court of Justice that liberalise inbound and outbound reincorporations, several Member 
States still prohibit these transactions or make them impossible or impractical. Even where 
reincorporations are available in principle, significant legal uncertainties often exist due to a 
lack of clear and interoperable rules. This situation may for instance jeopardise the interests 
of creditors and minority shareholders of the emigrating companies in circumstances where 
the involved jurisdictions do not provide for an explicit regulation of cross-border 
reincorporations aimed at protecting these stakeholders. Furthermore, when procedural rules 
are unclear or lacking, companies might be struck from the relevant register of the country of 
origin without being entered in the register of any other Member States. We argue that, as a 
consequence, harmonisation of the reincorporation process is necessary, and that it is 
desirable to reach a high minimum standard of creditor and minority shareholder protection 
and define clear rules for the cancellation of companies from the domestic register.  
 
Keywords: reincorporations, freedom of establishment, corporate mobility, comparative com-
pany law, Court of Justice of the European Union  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Companies incorporated under the law of a Member State may seek to subject themselves to 
another Member State’s law without going through the process of liquidation in their original 
jurisdiction. Such operations are usually labelled ‘cross-border reincorporations’, or just ‘re-
incorporations’. In the European Union, companies can pursue this goal either indirectly by 
way of a cross-border merger, or by using the vehicle of a Societas Europaea. Furthermore, 
recent decisions of the Court of Justice indicate that companies incorporated in a Member 
State should be allowed, in certain circumstances that will be discussed in detail later, to 
change the applicable company law without being forced into liquidation. Despite these deci-
sions, however, the issue of whether and to what extent freedom of establishment also covers 
cross-border reincorporations is still partially uncertain and, as a matter of fact, several Mem-
ber States still effectively restrict or even outright prohibit these transactions.1  
Even where both Member States concerned do allow reincorporations, a company can only 
change its applicable company law if both the country of origin and the country of destination 
address this type of transaction in their national laws and the company complies with the sub-
stantive laws of both countries.2 The need to comply with rules and principles of two juris-
dictions can give rise to significant practical problems. Indeed, reincorporation requirements 
vary widely across Member States, most of which have traditionally rendered such transac-
tions extremely difficult. In part, the difficulties can be explained in political terms, as Mem-
ber States’ legislators often regard company law as a device for protecting a wide range of 
corporate constituencies rather than merely addressing the shareholder-director relationship. 
The new applicable company law may be less protective of creditors, other stakeholders or 
minority shareholders than the law of the country of origin – or, at least, the country of origin 
may consider this to be the case. Consequently, a reincorporation might be harmful for these 
‘weak constituencies’ and companies might exploit such differences opportunistically, unless 
other legal mechanisms are in place to protect them. In this regard, it is also necessary to 
stress that the regulatory limits to reincorporations restrict the company’s capacity of chang-
ing the applicable law after its formation. These rules, therefore, are key elements of regula-
tory competition in company law.  
Cross-border reincorporations have been addressed in various scholarly studies.3 The present 
work will add to previous researches a comparative analysis of all Member States of the Eu-
                                                 
1 For references and details see section 3.1., below, regarding cross-border merges and SE and section 4 and 5 
regarding Member States’ law. 
2 However, compliance with the rules of the country of departure is only required insofar as they do not 
constitute restrictions of the freedom of establishment, or else are justified; see e.g. C-371/10 National Grid 
Indus BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond/kantoor Rotterdam, ECLI:EU:C:2011:785. 
3 Literature on EU freedom of establishment and companies’ private international law is boundless and a 
comprehensive overview is nearly impossible. With reference to scholarly papers in English addressing 
exclusively cross-border reincorporations in the EU, a reference can be made to, e.g., RR Drury, ‘Migrating 
companies’ (1999) 24 European Law Review 362; KE Sørensen and M Neville, ‘Corporate migration in the 
European Union: an analysis of the proposed 14th EC company law directive on the transfer of the registered 
office of a company from one Member State to another with a change of applicable law’ (2000) 6 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 191; E. Wymeersch, ‘The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in European Company 
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ropean Union regarding rules on transfer of a company’s registered office and cross-border 
reincorporations. The research underlying this paper was carried out as part of a ‘Study on 
the law applicable to companies’, prepared by the authors of this paper for the European 
Commission (DG Justice), which also comprises detailed country reports for all 28 Member 
States drafted by local experts based on a common template.4 Eventually, this paper will out-
line how the system may develop in the future.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 will address the policy issues arising from deci-
sions of changing applicable law. Section 3 depicts the current ‘state of the art’ regarding 
cross-border change of applicable company law: current possibilities to reincorporate 
throughout the EU and the case law of the Court of Justice. Sections 4 and 5 will compare 
and contrast the regimes of Member States related to ‘outbound’ and ‘inbound’ voluntary re-
incorporations. It will be shown that, even after the most recent case law of the Court of Jus-
tice on freedom of establishment, these national regimes still keep significant differences 
with regard to the possibility of domestic companies to change the applicable law without 
liquidation as well as regarding foreign companies who aim at converting into a domestic en-
tity. Section 6 will then analyse a recent submission for preliminary ruling received by the 
Court of Justice regarding a national ban of outbound reincorporations; we also argue that ju-
dicial decisions are not sufficient to create a coherent and workable system that allows rein-
corporations, without neglecting the interests of other stakeholders, and that EU harmonisa-
tion is needed. The final Section 7 concludes by summarising the results of the papers and 
stressing that comprehensive harmonization is the best option. 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY CROSS-BORDER REINCORPORATIONS 
The very existence of a legal person separate from its members, and the corresponding bene-
fit of limited liability that shareholders enjoy, stems from rules of the specific legal system 
according to which a company was created. 5 In the words of the Court of Justice, ‘companies 
are creatures of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national 
law’.6  
However, companies originally incorporated in a certain jurisdiction may seek to change their 
status and ‘convert’ into a company type governed by another jurisdiction. Such an operation 
                                                                                                                                                       
Law’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 661; WG Ringe, ‘No freedom of emigration for companies?’ 
(2005) 16 European Business Law Review 621; T Biermeyer, Stakeholder Protection in Cross-Border Seat 
Transfers in the EU (WLP 2015).  
4 This study comprises an empirical, comparative and normative analysis of the conflict or laws rules applicable 
to companies. The question of reincorporations is one of the topics addressed in the country reports of this 
study, thus forming the basis of the comparative analysis of the present paper. Each national report will be 
published in Private International of Companies in the European Union (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2018) [tbc] 
5 See e.g. P Ireland, ‘Limited liability, shareholder rights and the problem of corporate irresponsibility’ (2010) 
34 Cambridge Journal of Economics 837; MV Benedettelli, ‘Five lay commandments for the EU private 
international law of companies’ (2015/2016) 17 Yearbook of Private International Law 209 at 216. 
6 C-81/87, The Queen v HM Treasury and Commissioners for Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General 
Trust plc [1988] ECR 5483, at [19]. 
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can of course only be described as a ‘reincorporation’ where no liquidation is required in the 
original country of incorporation. It leads to an alteration of the (company) law to which the 
reincorporating company is subject, while not – at least not directly – affecting the compa-
ny’s operations, including the place where productive factors are situated. Reincorporations 
are similar to domestic conversions of a company into another company type,7 but differ in-
sofar as domestic conversions do not alter the State that has the power to adopt and amend 
the governing rules. In this respect, it is also necessary to highlight that such a shift of rule-
making power only concerns issues that are characterised as ‘company law’ for private inter-
national law purposes (lex societatis), also considering that EU law places certain limits on 
the characterisation by Member States.8  
In order for a reincorporation to be successful, the State of arrival should register the compa-
ny into its domestic commercial register as a continuation of the formerly existing company. 
This shift of registration, if allowed, is normally triggered by a decision taken by the compa-
ny to alter the clause in its articles of association indicating its ‘registered office’ or ‘statutory 
seat’. Courts and national registers, however, should additionally inquire whether the real in-
tention of the company was to also change the applicable company law. 9 Such an intention 
may be presumed when the company has approved a shift of its registered office or statutory 
seat.  In this regard, it is worth briefly shed a light on the terms ‘statutory seat’ and ‘registered 
office’. Although these terms are almost invariably used interchangeably in scholarly articles 
and in most EU legislative materials10, they might refer to different concepts in different ju-
risdictions. In particular, the concept of ‘registered office’ derives from English law and re-
fers to the place filed with Companies House11, where documents may be served and kept for 
inspection.12 The concept of ‘statutory seat’, by contrast, refers to a place mentioned in the 
articles of association, which is normally located in the same country where the company is 
registered.13 Consequently, in jurisdictions that adopt the concept of ‘statutory seat’, compa-
                                                 
7 For instance conversion of, or re-registration by, a private limited company as public limited company. 
8 C Gerner-Beuerle and EP Schuster, ‘The Costs of Separation: Conflicts in Company and Insolvency Law in 
Europe’ (2014) 14 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 287, at 321; see also Bendettelli, ‘Five lay 
commandments’ (n 5), 225-232 (stressing that, when EU legislative instruments are silent regarding 
characterization, the risk of negative or positive conflict of law arise). 
9 MV Benedettelli, ‘Sul trasferimento della sede sociale all’estero’ (2010) 55 Rivista delle Società 1251 at 1265. 
10 See, however, Brussels 1 Regulation on jurisdiction (recast), 2012, whose art. 63 maintains that a company is 
domiciled, among other factors, at the place where it has its statutory seat, and that in Ireland, Cyprus and the 
United Kingdom, ‘statutory seat’ means a companies’ registered office.  
11 Companies Act 2006 s. 9(2)(b). See D Prentice, ‘The incorporation theory – The United Kingdom’ (2003) 14 
European Business Law Review 1. 
12 Companies Act 2006 s. 1136 and s. 1139(1). 
13 J Rickford, ‘Current development in European law on restructuring of companies: An introduction’ (2004) 15 
European Business Law Review 1229; J von Hein, ‘Zur Kodification des europäischen Übernahmekolli-
sionsrechts’ (2005) Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 545. See First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 
1968 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are 
required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the 
Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community, as amended (now recast 
as Directive 2009/101/EC), which requires the presence of a ‘registered office’ in the Member State of 
registration.  
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nies, at least in theory, could be allowed to amend the clause of their articles of association 
indicating their ‘statutory seat’ without necessarily changing their registration and the appli-
cable law, if they so wish.14 
As a consequence, in this paper we define reincorporation as a transaction in which a compa-
ny decides to voluntarily change the applicable company law to which it is subject and in-
tends to do so without going through the liquidation process in the country of incorporation. 
Such reincorporations may or may not entail a relocation of the company’s ‘headquarters’, or 
‘central administration’ or any other physical elements of the company’s business. 
At firm level, from the perspective of shareholders, cross-border reincorporations should aim 
at attaining efficiency gains due to the application of a more suitable company law. A change 
of the applicable company law will typically result in a number of significant changes for 
shareholders and directors of the company. For instance, majority requirements, the balance 
of powers between shareholders and the board, directors’ liability, the structure of the board, 
as well as rules limiting departures from the ‘one-share-one-vote’ default rule will change as 
a result of this operation.  
All national company laws in the EU, however, go beyond just regulating the relationship be-
tween shareholders and directors: they also contain (partly harmonised) mandatory rules for 
the protection of creditors and other stakeholders, and often also try to address other potential 
negative externalities. Typical examples of company law rules that aim at protecting creditors 
are rules on capital formation, limits to dividends and prohibitions of disguised distributions, 
directors’ duties in the vicinity of insolvency15 or participation rights of employees in the 
company’s decision-making bodies (‘codetermination’).16 A decision to reincorporate from 
one jurisdiction to another will negatively affect creditors or other stakeholders under two 
conditions: (a) the rules aiming at protecting these stakeholders fall within the scope of 
‘company law’ in the Member State of origin and the destination Member State; (b) the com-
pany law regime of the new jurisdiction is less protective than the original lex societatis. Al-
ternatively, protection deficits may also arise if the legal mechanism protecting creditors or 
other stakeholders is present in the laws of both Member States, but the international scope of 
application of the mechanisms is determined according to different connecting factors. If, for 
instance, a jurisdiction relies exclusively or mostly on company law rules to protect creditors 
and other stakeholders, rather than addressing these issues through insolvency or tort law, 
moving the statutory seat, but not the real seat, to another jurisdiction that uses predominantly 
the latter strategies to address the same underlying problems could be detrimental. 17 Im-
portantly, in this example, the detrimental effect may not depend on differences in the abso-
                                                 
14  See e.g. H Eidenmüller, ‘Mobilität und Restrukturierung von Unternehmen im Binnenmarkt’ (2004) 
Juristenzeitung 32; S Lombardo, ‘Libertà di stabilimento e mobilità delle società in Europa’ (2005) Nuova 
giurisprudenza civile commentata 372. 
15  See e.g. L Enriques and M Gelter, ‘Regulatory Competition in European Company Law and Creditor 
Protection’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 417 at 422-435. A comparison of the English 
and the German regimes on capital maintenance can be found in T Bachner, Creditor Protection in Private 
Companies (Cambridge University Press 2009) 115.  
16 For an overview of workers participation regimes in EU Member States see www.worker-participation.eu/.  
17 For more details, see the discussion in Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster (n 8). 
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lute level of protection afforded to different corporate constituencies. Thus, the fact that sig-
nificant differences exist between company laws across the EU may give rise to regulatory 
arbitrage and, potentially, to regulatory competition among jurisdictions, as companies seek 
to become subject to the legal regime least burdensome to them, given the specific situation 
they are in. In the absence of legal rules addressing this potential problem, reincorporations 
may pose a significant risk to stakeholders, as companies may act in opportunistic ways when 
deciding to change the law by which they – and their relationships with third parties – are 
governed. 
Apart from a change of the applicable company law, reincorporations may also have a num-
ber of additional effects. First of all, according to the Insolvency Regulation, reincorporations 
also lead to a change of the competent insolvency venue and the applicable insolvency re-
gime, unless creditors provide evidence that the company’s centre of main interests (‘COMI’) 
is still in the country of origin.18  Furthermore, a relocation of the registered office might lead 
to a shift of the competent jurisdiction in civil cases to the country of arrival.19 Therefore, 
although shareholders may attain efficiency gains through the application of a more suitable 
company law, reincorporations may also harm creditors and other stakeholders when the 
newly applicable rules are less protective than the original ones.  
 
3. STATE OF THE ART IN THE EU 
3.1. Current possibilities to reincorporate 
Companies incorporated in a EU Member State can effectively change the applicable compa-
ny law regime, without liquidation, by converting into, or otherwise forming a European 
Company (Societas Europaea, hereinafter ‘SE’),20 or by implementing a cross-border mer-
ger.21  
The SE Regulation only provides a general regulatory framework for SEs, which are mostly 
governed by the regime for public companies of the Member State where their registered of-
fice is situated.22 SEs can relocate their registered office from one Member State to any other 
                                                 
18 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings, OJ L141/19 (hereinafter the ‘Insolvency Regulation Recast’), art. 3(1). 
19 See Brussels I Regulation Recast, Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 , art. 63. The Brussels I Regulation also 
grants exclusive jurisdiction to the state of a company’s ‘seat’, but only with regard to some subject matters; the 
same article also maintains that ‘[i]n order to determine that seat, the court shall apply its rules of private 
international law’, with the consequence that if both countries follows the idea that a company’s seat is its 
registered office, a transfer of the latter would lead to a shift of jurisdiction; see Brussels I Regulation (recast) 
article 24(2). On jurisdictional issues see MV Benedettelli, ‘Conflicts of jurisdiction and conflicts of law in 
company law matters within the EU “market for corporate models”: Brussels I and Rome I after Centros’ (2005) 
16 European Business Law Review 55 at 61-3.  
20  Regulation of the Council 2157/2001/CE, October 8th 2001, on the statute of the European Company 
(hereinafter, the ‘SE Regulation’). 
21 Under the national rules implementing Directive 2005/56/EC [2005] OJ L 310/1. 
22 SE Regulation, Art. 9(1). See e.g. J Rickford, ‘The European Company’ in J Rickford (ed) The European 
Company: Developing a Community Law of Corporations (Antwerp: Intersentia 2003) ch 2. 
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country of the European Economic Area,23 provided that their registered office is located in 
the same Member State where their head office is situated.24 Therefore, the SE is not a vehi-
cle for free (or ‘pure’) choice of law, for an SE must always transfer its head office together 
with its registered office from one jurisdiction to another. SEs, however, can only be incorpo-
rated by pre-existing public companies in specific circumstances, which are detailed in the 
SE Regulation and whose common denominator is the existence of a cross-border connec-
tion. 25  Meeting these formal requirements will often require additional reorganisations, 
thereby increasing transaction costs. 
Companies incorporated in an EU Member State may also make use of cross-border mergers 
to achieve effects equivalent to a reincorporation.26 Such de facto reincorporations are im-
plemented by founding a new ‘shell’ company in another Member State (usually a wholly-
owned subsidiary), and then merging into the newly formed foreign company. Cross-border 
mergers of this type can now be implemented under a common procedural framework,27 
which has led to a significant simplification of these transactions. This transaction, in addi-
tion, is typically tax neutral, as are national mergers in most cases.28 However, the procedure 
for reincorporations using a cross-border merger can be relatively time-consuming and costly, 
depending on the legislation of the Member States involved and due to the absence of a ‘fast-
track procedure’,29 in particular when the only aim of a cross-border merger is relocating the 
company’s registered office, without implementing a real integration between different com-
panies.  
 
3.2. Summary of case law of the Court of Justice  
The main question of whether cross-border reincorporations, by way of relocating the regis-
tered office, are covered by freedom of establishment remains unresolved. First, the question 
arises of whether freedom of establishment requires Member States to allow domestic com-
panies to reincorporate in another Member State without forcing them to liquidate. The sec-
ond question is whether companies incorporated in another Member State have a right to in-
                                                 
23 SE Regulation, Art. 8. The SE Regulation also applies to EEA countries that are not Member States of the EU 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway): article 77 and annex XXII EEA Agreement. 
24 SE Regulation, Art. 7. On this see e.g. Ringe, ‘The European Company Statute in the Context of Freedom of 
Establishment’ (2007) 7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 185, at 186 – 191.  
25 SE Regulation, article 2 
26 Reincorporations in the US are also typically implemented through cross-state mergers; see, for instance, 
Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 11.02 (1984). 
27 Directive 2005/56/EC, of the Parliament and the Council, October 26th 2005, on cross-border mergers of 
limited liability companies (hereinafter, the ‘Cross-Border Merger Directive’), entered into force on December 
16th 2007. See M Siems, ‘The European Directive on Cross-Border Mergers: An International Model?’ (2004-
2005) 11 Columbia Journal of European Law 167. 
28 See Directive 90/434/EEC on a common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of 
assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States, as amended by Directive 
2005/19/EC. 
29 See Becht-Bruun & Lexidale, Study on the Application of the Cross-Border Merger Directive (2013) at pp. 36 
and 112; J Schmidt ‘Cross-border mergers and divisions, transfers of seat: Is there a need to legislate?’, Study 
for the JURI committee (Legal Affairs) of the European Parliament (2016) at pp. 32-3 
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corporate as domestic companies, without the need to liquidate and with full continuity of 
their rights and duties. In both cases, the overarching questions arise of whether the involved 
member States can require the ‘emigrating’ companies to also relocate their head office or 
other physical elements into the country of arrival.  
In recent years, the Court of Justice has gradually clarified its case law in order to favour mo-
bility, although the present situation is still partially ambiguous. In Daily Mail,30 the Europe-
an Court of Justice addressed the restrictions placed by the UK on the relocation of a domes-
tic company’s administrative seat and tax domicile to the Netherlands. The ECJ held that 
such a restriction was not in violation of the freedom of establishment. The Court based its 
opinion on a general assumption regarding the relationship between a company and its state 
of incorporation. In particular, it was maintained that ‘unlike natural persons, companies are 
creatures of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law. 
They exist only by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines their incorpo-
ration and functioning’.31 As a consequence, the ECJ concluded that the freedom of estab-
lishment ‘cannot be interpreted as conferring on companies incorporated under the law of a 
Member State a right to transfer their central management and control and their central ad-
ministration to another Member State while retaining their status as companies incorporated 
under the legislation of the first Member State.’32 At a closer look, however, Daily Mail re-
veals several ambiguities. This decision only concerned the outbound relocation of a compa-
ny’s tax residence, not outbound reincorporations (which, as we shall see, are impossible out 
of the UK).33 Additionally, the ECJ also emphasised that freedom of establishment ‘prohibits 
the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one 
of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation’.34  
The Court of Justice partially clarified these issues in the more recent decisions Cartesio35 
and VALE. The decision rendered in the case Cartesio was related to a Hungarian company 
                                                 
30 Daily Mail (n 6) 
31 Daily Mail (n 6) [19]. 
32 Daily Mail (n 6) [24]. This was confirmed in C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company 
Baumanagement GmbH [2002] ECR I-9919 (ECLI:EU:C:2002:632) [61–72] and C-167/01 Kamer van 
Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art [2003] ECR I-1095 (ECLI:EU:C:2003:512) [102], 
distinguishing Daily Mail from the cases that were under review on the basis of the fact that the restrictions at 
issue concerned ‘moving-in’ scenarios, whereas Daily Mail was only related to moving-out situations: See e.g. 
U Forsthoff, in H Hirte and T Bücker (eds.) Grenzüberschreitende Gesellschaften (Carl Heymanns, Köln, 2005) 
57. 
33 See S Lombardo, ‘Conflict of law rules in company law after Überseering: An economic and comparative 
analysis of the allocation of policy competence in the European Union’ (2003) 3 European Business 
Organization Law Review 301 at 306; FM Mucciarelli, ‘Company ‘emigration’ and EC freedom of 
establishment: Daily Mail revisited’ (2008) 9 European Business Organization Law Review 268 at 295. 
34 Daily Mail (n 6) [16]. Confirmed in C-264/96 Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v. Kenneth Hall Colmer 
(HM Inspector of Taxes) [1998] ECR I-4695; C-9/02 Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministère de 
l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie [2004] ECR I-2409; C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey 
(Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-10837. 
35 C- 210/06 Cartesio Oktato es Szolgaltato bt [2008] ECR I-9641 (ECLI:EU:C:2008:723). See J Borg-Barthet, 
‘Free at last? Choice of corporate law in the EU folling the judgment in Vale’ (2013) 62 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 503; A Baert, ‘Crossing Borders: Exploring the Need for a Fourteenth EU 
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that intended to transfer its ‘seat’ (székhely) to Italy, while continuing to be governed by 
Hungarian law as lex societatis. According to Hungarian substantive rules in force at the time 
when Cartesio sought to transfer its ‘seat’ abroad, a company’s headquarter could not be de-
tached from its registered office, with the consequence that Cartesio was also compelled to 
be removed from the Hungarian register even though it did not seek to change the applicable 
company law.36 The Court concluded that ‘a Member State has the power to define […] the 
connecting factor required’ for a company to be incorporated under its law,37 and thus being 
capable of enjoying the right of establishment, and the criteria for continuing to maintain that 
status.38 That included, in continuity with Daily Mail, the power ‘not to permit a company 
governed by its law to retain that status if the company intends to reorganise itself in another 
Member State by moving its seat’ there, ‘thereby breaking the connecting factor required un-
der the national law of the Member State of incorporation’.39 Importantly, however, the Court 
also explains40 that this power does not include the capacity to impede a ‘conversion’ into a 
company governed by the law of a new Member State. Rather, freedom of establishment 
gives the right, as against the Member State of origin, to reincorporate a company abroad, so 
that any restriction to voluntary outbound reincorporations must be justified by overriding 
reasons in the public interest.41 In particular, the Court views liquidation requirements for 
                                                                                                                                                       
Company Law Directive on the Transfer of the Registered Office’ (2015) 26 European Business Law Review 
581 at 597. 
36 Act CXLV of 1997 on the Register of Companies, Public Company Information and Court Registration 
Proceedings, art. 16(1). See now, Act on Firm Information, Firm Registration and Voluntary Liquidation 
Proceedings, 2006, s. 7(b), in force from September 1st 2007. It is worth mentioning that Hungarian conflict of 
law rules for companies are based upon the incorporation theory: Statutory Rule No. 13 of 1979 on Private 
International Law, art. 18. See V Korom and P Metzinger, ‘Freedom of establishment for company: the 
European Court of Justice confirms and refines its Daily Mail Decision in the Cartesio Case C-210/06’ (2009) 6 
European Company and Financial Law Review 144. 
37 Cartesio (n 35) [110]. However, despite the Court of Justice seems to consider them as connecting factors 
(see Cartesio at paragraph 108), the three criteria mentioned in article 54 TFEU (registered office, central 
administration and principal place of business) are rather elements that companies should have on the territory 
of the EU in order to enjoy freedom of establishment (under the implicit assumption that these companies have 
been validly formed under the law of a Member State); see Benedettelli, ‘Five lay commandments’ (n 5) 220;S  
Lombardo, ‘Regulatory Competition in Company Law in the European Union after Cartesio’ (2009) 10 
European Business Organization Law Review 628; Korom and Metzinger (n 36) 149; C Teichmann, ‘Cartesio: 
Die Freiheit zum Formwechselden Wegzug’ (2009) Zeitschrift für Wirstschaftsrecht 393 at 400; D Dashwood  
et al., Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law (Hart, 2011) 648; R Schütze, European Union Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015) 611. 
38 Cartesio (n 35) [110]. 
39 Cartesio (n 35) [110]. See Korom and Metzinger (n 36) 159; J Armour and WG Ringe, ‘European company 
law 1999-2010: renaissance and crisis’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 125 at 140. 
40  Cartesio (n 35) [111–113]. On the distinction between outbound reincorporations (included in the EU 
freedom of establishment) and cases in which a company relocates some relevant factors out of the state of 
origin without seeking a reincorporation (not included) see S Lombardo, ‘Regulatory Competition’ (n 37) 638; 
C Gerner-Beuerle and M Schilling, ‘The mysteries of freedom of establishment after Cartesio’ (2010) 59 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 303 at 311 (stressing the ambiguities of the Cartesio decision); P 
Paschalidis, Freedom of Establishment and Private International Law for Corporations (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 82. 
41 Cartesio (n 35) [113]. 
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companies reincorporating abroad as (generally) disproportionate restrictions. However, the 
Court’s statement in Cartesio was not directly relevant to the case decided, and thus consti-
tutes a mere obiter dictum.42 The Cartesio ruling, therefore, does not seem to provide conclu-
sive answers to the question of whether Member States must allow domestic companies to re-
incorporate abroad or, at least, it may be debated whether this part of the Cartesio ruling is 
directly binding or not. 
Furthermore, in the decision VALE43, the Court of Justice addressed the case of an Italian pri-
vate limited company that sought to reincorporate under Hungarian law, with the Hungarian 
register refusing to label the company as the ‘universal successor’ of the Italian entity.44 The 
Court of Justice maintained that any national legislation ‘which enables national companies 
to convert, but does not allow companies governed by the law of another Member State to do 
so, falls within the scope of’ the freedom of establishment.45 A first consequence is that any 
restrictions to inbound reincorporations need to be justified by overriding reasons in the pub-
lic interest and must be ‘appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objectives pursued and 
does not go beyond what is necessary to attain them’.46 Consequently, a complete ban on re-
incorporations goes beyond what is necessary to protect those interests. 47  Furthermore, 
Member States must comply with the principles of ‘equivalence and effectiveness’, and the 
recording of the designation ‘predecessor in law’ could not be denied to VALE Costruzioni if 
it was granted in domestic conversions.48 Finally, we should stress that in VALE the Court of 
Justice also addressed the concept of ‘establishment’ for the purpose of applying articles 49 
and 54 of the Treaty. In this respect, the Court has clarified that this concept ‘involves the ac-
tual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in the host Member State 
for an indefinite period’ and that ‘it presupposes actual establishment of the company con-
cerned in that State and the pursuit of genuine economic activity there’.49 In the VALE ruling, 
therefore, the Court of Justice refers to the concept of ‘establishment’ developed in the deci-
sions Factortame50 and Cadbury Schweppes.51 From the point of view of the country of arri-
val, the consequence is that inbound cross-border reincorporations fall within the scope of the 
freedom of establishment only if the company decides to also relocate the place where it ac-
                                                 
42 See Opinion of AG Kokott C-106/16 Polbud v Wykonawstwo sp. z.o.o., 4 May 2017 (ECLI:EU:C:2017:351) 
[40]. 
43 C-378/10 VALE Építési kft. [2012] (ECLI:EU:C:2012:440). 
44 VALE (n 43) [45]. 
45 VALE (n 43) [33]. 
46 VALE (n 43) [39]. The Court of Justice only refers to the decision C‑411/03 Sevic Systems [2005] ECR I‑
10805, but this ‘test’ for assessing restrictions to the freedom of establishment was originally formulated in the 
C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-
04165. 
47 VALE (n 43) [40]. 
48 VALE (n 43) [57]. 
49 VALE (n 43) [34]. 
50 C-221/89, E. v Secretary of State for transport ex p. Factortame [1991] ECR I-3905 [20]. 
51 C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc, Cadbury Schweppes Oversead Ltd v. Commissioners of Ireland Revenue 
[2006] ECR I-8031. In the latter decision the Court also added that a company’s establishment is revealed by 
‘objective factors, which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the 
company physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment’: Cadbury Schweppes ibid [67]. 
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tually pursues ‘genuine economic activity’ into the country of arrival; by contrast, a mere re-
location of the registered office from another Member State, without any genuine link with 
the country of arrival, is not protected by EU freedom of establishment.52  
 
3.3. Legislative proposals  
The oldest proposals for harmonising private international law for companies did not include 
rules on reincorporations. Neither the proposal drafted in 1965 by the Institute of Internation-
al Law53, nor the European Draft Convention of 196854, mention the possibility to relocate a 
company’s ‘registered office’ abroad or to reincorporate under the law of another jurisdiction. 
The Hague Convention on the recognition of the legal personality of foreign companies, as-
sociations and institutions, drafted in 1956, only provided that contracting States should rec-
ognise the continuity of a company’s legal personality after a transfer of the statutory seat 
(siège statutaire), provided that such continuity is recognised in the two States concerned.55  
In the European Community, the first detailed proposal for a directive, which was eventually 
not approved, was presented in 1997.56 The 1997 proposal did not harmonise the primary 
connecting factor, be it based on the ‘incorporation theory’ or the ‘real seat theory’.57 Conse-
quently, companies that sought to reincorporate out of a real seat country needed to relocate 
their real seat abroad, and companies that sought to reincorporate into a real seat country had 
to relocate the respective connecting factor onto their territory. According to the 1997 pro-
posal, additionally, the reincorporation plan had to be published in the commercial register of 
the country of origin58 and shareholders had to approve this proposal with qualified majori-
ty.59  
In 2002 a panel of corporate law specialists, entrusted by the EU Commission with the task of 
developing reform proposals for European company law (the ‘high level group’), recom-
mended liberalising reincorporations as a way to improve both the efficient allocation of re-
sources and the quality of domestic laws.60 Along this line, the Action Plan issued in 2003 by 
                                                 
52 Member States, however, are free to accept that foreign companies reincorporate as domestic entities without 
relocating any economic activities. See KE Sørensen, ‘The fight against letterbox companies in the internal 
market’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 85 at 88; Biermeyer (n 3) 67-68; Biermeyer ‘Shaping the right 
of cross-border conversions in the EU. Between right and autonomy: Vale’ (2013) Common Market Law Review 
571 at 588; W Schön, ‘Das System der gesellschaftsrechtlichen Niederlassungsfreiheiten nach VALE’ (2013) 
Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 333 at 351. 
53 Companies in private international law, 1965: www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1965_var_02_en.pdf 
54  Draft Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate, 1968, OJ 2-196: 
http://aei.pitt.edu/5610/1/5610.pdf 
55 Hague Convention concerning the recognition of the legal personality of foreign companies, associations and 
institutions, available 1956, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=36. 
56  Document XV/D2/6002/97-EN REV.2 (hereinafter the ‘1997 Proposal’). See RR Drury, ‘Migrating 
companies’ (1999) European Law Review 362. 
57 Article 3, 1997 Proposal of a 14th Directive. 
58 Article 4, 1997 Proposal of a 14th Directive. 
59 Article 6, 1997 Proposal of a 14th Directive 
60 High Level Group, ‘A modern regulatory framework for company law in Europe’, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf, p. 101. 
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the Commission, which was aimed at modernising company law, maintained that issuing a 
directive on cross-border reincorporations (which would be the 14th directive on company 
law) was a priority for the EU.61 In the following years, various resolutions and reports of the 
European Parliament have requested the European Commission to present new proposal for a 
directive on the cross border transfer of companies’ registered offices, 62  specifying that 
Member States should adopt provisions for the protection of dissenting shareholders, includ-
ing a withdrawal right from the ‘emigrating’ company, and creditors should be protected by a 
security deposit.  
A full-fledged policy analysis conducted in 2007, however, has revealed a more complex sit-
uation. This assessment concluded that harmonisation could be too onerous and not propor-
tionate, ‘considering that the practical effect of the existing legislation on cross-border mobil-
ity (i.e. the Cross-Border Merger Directive) is not yet known and that the Community ap-
proach to the issue of the transfer of the registered office might be clarified by the Court of 
Justice in the near future’, with the consequence that ‘it might be advisable to wait until the 
impacts of those developments can be fully assessed and the need and scope for any EU ac-
tion better defined.’ 63 Therefore, the project of harmonising Member States’ regimes on 
cross-border transfers of the registered office was eventually put on hold.  
Finally, a public consultation launched in 2012 on the future of European company law con-
firmed the interest of the respondents in a legislative initiative aimed at clarifying that Euro-
pean companies can transfer their registered office throughout the EU and reincorporate in 
another Member State without having to liquidate in the country of origin, and at regulating 
such cross-border reincorporations.64 The 2012 Action Plan on company law and corporate 
governance65 acknowledged that the issue of cross-border reincorporations was relevant and  
that ‘any future initiative in this matter needs to be underpinned by robust economic data and 
a thorough assessment of a practical and genuine need for and use made of European rules on 
transfer of seat.’ Following this acknowledgement, in 2013, the European Commission 
launched a new public consultation on the transfer of a company’s seat, which confirmed that 
in most Member States the rules on cross-border transfers of statutory seat (or registered of-
                                                 
61 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Modernising Company 
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, at 22 
(COM(2003) 284 final). See also the consultation launched in 2004: 
http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/results/transfer/index_en.htm. 
62 See Resolution of the European Parliament of 25 October 2007 [P6_TA(2007)0491]; Resolution of the 
European Parliament of 10 March 2009 [P6_TA(2009)0086]; Resolution of the European Parliament of 2 
February 2012 [P7_TA(2012)0019]. 
63 See Commission of the European Community, Impact assessment on the Directive on the cross-border 
transfer of registered office, Brussels, 12.12.2007 SEC(2007) 1707. See GJ Vossestein, ‘Transfer of the 
registered office: The European Commission’s decision not to submit a proposal for a Directive’ (2008) 4 
Utrecht Law Review 53. 
64 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2012/companylaw/feedback_statement_en.pdf 
65  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance 
- a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies (Text with EEA 
relevance) Strasbourg, 12.12.2012 COM(2012) 740 final. 
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fice) were still unclear and that the Court of Justice’s decisions rendered in the cases Cartesio 
and VALE were not sufficient to clarify all regulatory issues.66 Finally, we should mention 
that the Commission’ Work Programme 2017 does not mention initiatives for cross-border 
transfer of registered offices or reincorporations67 and the plan put forward by the Estonian 
Presidency is still uncertain as to whether initiative in this field are necessary or not68; at the 
same time, a new consultation was just launched, which includes conflict-of-law rules for 
companies  and cross-border ‘conversions’.69  
 
4. VOLUNTARY OUTBOUND REINCORPORATIONS IN THE EU 
4.1. Policy and legal issues  
Whether a company can reincorporate in another (EU) jurisdiction will depend, first, on the 
company law of the current State of incorporation. In particular, the question will turn on 
whether the State of origin permits, as a matter of practice, a process whereby a domestic 
company is struck from its register and thus loses its status under that law without going 
through a formal liquidation procedure. Even where this is the case, the practical possibility 
for companies to reincorporate abroad will also depend on the interoperability of the applica-
ble substantive and procedural rules for such a reincorporation in both the country of origin 
and the destination country. Whether reincorporations are in fact possible can thus only be 
precisely answered for specific pairs of countries.  
From a policy perspective, a Member State’s desire to allow or prohibit outbound reincorpo-
rations will depend on a number of different factors. Perhaps most importantly, it will depend 
on the way in which a given jurisdiction views – and uses – company law rules: Member 
States that view company law primarily as way to facilitate structures that minimise agency 
problems arising between shareholders and directors will naturally see the continued applica-
bility of their company law rules as less important than jurisdictions with a broader, especial-
ly social view of the tasks and aims of company law. In several Member States, company law 
rules, besides regulating companies’ internal affairs, that is to say the agency problem arising 
between shareholders and directors and the relation among shareholders, also address agency 
problems arising between companies and their creditors. For instance, a widespread strategy 
for protecting creditors is based on rules on capital formation and capital maintenance, and 
minimum capital requirements in public (and possibly private) companies, yet the intensity of 
creditor protection varies from Member State to Member State.70 Additionally, in several ju-
risdictions the level of creditor protection is higher in public companies than in private com-
                                                 
66  See European Commission (DG Market), Feedback statement, Summary of responses to the public 
consultation on Cross-border transfers if registered offices of companies, September 2013.  
67 Se: Commission Work Programme 2017 at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/cwp_2017_en.pdf  
68 See the programme for a ‘21st European Company Law and Corporate Governance Conference: Crossing 
Borders, Digitally’ at http://www.just.ee/en/conferences-during-estonian-presidency  
69 See: https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/CompanyLawPackageSurvey2017.  
70 See e.g. E Ferran, ‘The place for creditor protection on the agenda for modernisation of company law in the 
European Union’ (2006) 3 European Company and Financial Law Review 178 at 214-217. 
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panies.71 Furthermore, certain Member States include in the lex societatis rules on debentures 
and the powers of debenture holders, while in most jurisdictions these issues are governed by 
the lex contractus.72 Finally, it is worth noting that in some Member States employees have 
the right to appoint a certain number of directors or members of the supervisory board (‘code-
termination’).73 
In these circumstances, a reincorporation under the law of another jurisdiction could be seen 
as harming creditors or employees if the new jurisdiction is less protective than the country of 
origin,74 unless that country regards these rules as overriding mandatory provisions also ap-
plicable to (pseudo-)foreign companies (to the extent that such outreach-application is com-
patible with the Treaty). The impact of reincorporations on creditors and other stakeholders 
also depends on the scope of company law in the country of origin. If rules protecting credi-
tors and other stakeholders are included in the scope of company law, reincorporations might 
harm these stakeholders, if the country of arrival is not as ‘protective’ as the country of origin. 
By contrast, if the country of origin protects creditors and other stakeholders through ‘non-
company law’ rules, such as insolvency law or tort law, a reincorporation is likely to be less 
harmful to pre-existing stakeholders, who can continue to rely on the application of insolven-
cy or tort law of the country of origin (unless all relevant connecting factors, including a 
company’s COMI, are moved together with the registered office).75  
Regarding creditor protection, things are further complicated by the significant differences 
between the regulation of private and public companies that exist in several countries. Rules 
on creditor protection of public companies are partially harmonised at EU level, while virtu-
ally no such harmonisation has taken place in relation to private companies.76 Furthermore, in 
recent years a trend has emerged throughout the European Union to reduce or abolish mini-
mum capital requirements, at least as far as private limited companies are concerned.77 Con-
sequently, in some Member States significant differences have emerged in the level of pro-
tection afforded to creditors of private and public companies, respectively. The effects of a 
reincorporation may thus depend not only on each country’s regime, but also on national 
company types involved. Moreover, powers of minority shareholders and strategies aimed at 
                                                 
71 See L Enriques and M Gelter, ‘Regulatory competition in European company law and creditor protection’ 
(2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 417. 
72 According to the country reports accompanying the Study on the Law Applicable to Companies, in most 
Member States, the validity, content and underlying rights of bonds fall within the scope of the Rome I 
Regulation; in some jurisdictions, however (Bulgaria, Italy and Portugal), bonds issued by domestic companies 
are, at least in part, governed by domestic rules.  
73 A comprehensive overview of jurisdictions adopting fors of workers’ participation at board level is to be 
found at www.worker-participation.eu/About-WP/European-Participation-Index-EPI. 
74 This is the case for example when the law of country of arrival does not provide for codetermination 
mechanisms or when capital maintenance rules are weaker than those of the country of origin. 
75 Lombardo, ‘Regulatory competition’ (n 37) 647; FM Mucciarelli, ‘The Function of Corporate Law and the 
Effects of Reincorporations in the U.S. and the EU’ (2012) 20 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 421 at 458-461. 
76 Directive 77/91/EEC of the Council (Second Company Law Directive). 
77 See GH Roth and P Kindler, The Spirit of Corporate Law – Core Principles of Corporate Law in Continental 
Europe (C.H. Beck: 2013) 60.  
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protecting them vary from Member State to Member State.78 Where the law of the country of 
arrival is less protective of minority shareholders than the country of origin, a cross-border 
reincorporation could therefore also harm this group of stakeholders.  
These are the main policy reasons why in several Member States reincorporations are re-
stricted or not allowed by national law. In particular, a complete ban of outbound reincorpo-
rations, although it is unlikely to be compatible with the Treaty, would be an effective strate-
gy to protect the acquired interests and expectations of pre-existing creditors or other stake-
holders, who rely on the application of company law rules of the country of incorporation. 
Alternatively, when reincorporations are allowed, the State of incorporation may provide for 
specific legal mechanisms and procedural safeguards to protect minority shareholders, credi-
tors and other stakeholders, such as: (a) supermajority requirements for the approval of these 
decisions; (b) further safeguards aimed at protecting dissenting minority shareholders, such 
as the right to withdraw from the company; (c) special safeguards aimed at protecting credi-
tors, such as the right to object to the reincorporation or to request a guarantee.79  
Finally, it is important to also assess the procedural and technical aspects of reincorporations 
in the State of origin. Such technicalities and procedures have significant practical and theo-
retical implications. Companies typically do not exist unless registered in an official com-
mercial or company register. Companies, in other words, cannot exist independently from a 
jurisdiction of incorporation and, consequently, reincorporations require continuity of regis-
trations across jurisdictions. Once a company – in accordance with the private international 
law rules of both jurisdictions involved – starts being governed by the law of the new juris-
diction, its articles of association need to comply with the provisions of that jurisdiction.80 
Furthermore, it is the State of origin that governs the point in time when the domestic com-
mercial register strikes off that company. In this context, the question arises of whether the 
‘emigrating company’ should be cancelled only after it has been registered in the companies 
register of the destination country as a domestically incorporated company. If a company was 
cancelled from the company register of the State of origin before being registered in the State 
of arrival, there would be a period of time during which that company would not be regis-
tered anywhere, and thus not exist. All these issues, as we shall see in the subsequent com-
parative analysis, are still uncertain in most Member States of the EU. 
 
4.2. Comparative analysis  
Despite the most recent decisions of the Court of Justice, Member States still follow a variety 
of strategies with regard to cross-border reincorporations of domestic companies, ranging 
from complete prohibition to explicit and detailed regulations of these transactions. In this re-
spect, we have classified Member States in three groups, considering the ‘law in action’, not 
                                                 
78 See PH Conac, L Enriques and M Gelter, ‘Constraining dominant shareholders’ self dealing’ (2007) 4 
European Company and Financial Law Review 490. 
79 For details see the subsequent section 4.2. 
80 See T Luchsinger, Die Niederlassungsfreiheit der Kapitalgesellschaften in der EG, den USA und der Schweiz 
(Universitätverlag Freiburg, 1992) 21.  
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just the ‘law on the books’. This classification is based on whether, and to what extent, rein-
corporations are accepted and feasible in a given legal system. In jurisdictions where reincor-
porations are not regulated, this analysis also sheds a light on how legal scholars and courts 
react to the developments of EU law and adapt the interpretation of domestic law accordingly. 
The first category of countries includes jurisdictions that explicitly allow domestic companies 
to change the applicable company law without liquidation and that regulate, either partially or 
comprehensively, this operation. The second class of countries comprehends jurisdictions 
from which outbound reincorporations are, as a matter of fact, impossible or not allowed de-
spite the most recent decisions of the Court of Justice. The last group includes jurisdictions 
that do not regulate reincorporations, but where scholars and courts are increasingly of the 
opinion that domestic companies should have the possibility to reincorporate abroad despite 
the lack of rules. 
(a) Jurisdictions that explicitly allow voluntary outbound reincorporations  
One group of jurisdictions, namely Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal, 
statutorily allow domestic companies to ‘reincorporate’ abroad, or to change their ‘nationali-
ty’, although domestic legislation does not fully regulate the procedural details of this trans-
action. Interestingly, all of these countries retain certain elements of the ‘real seat theory’, 
and the applicability of these elements to EU-incorporated companies is often not entirely 
clear. The consequence of relying on the real seat as relevant connecting factor for reincorpo-
rations within the EU would be that companies should transfer both their administrative seat 
and their statutory seat in order to reincorporate abroad. All of the above regimes except Bel-
gium regulate the internal decision procedure and the mechanisms for protecting shareholders, 
while no special creditor protection rules are foreseen. According to the Portuguese Compa-
nies Act, the general meeting of shareholders has to approve the transfer of the real seat 
abroad with a supermajority of 75% of the share capital and dissenting or absent shareholders 
can withdraw from the company; however, there is no provision to protect creditors. 81 
French82 companies, by contrast, can change their ‘nationality’ (that is to say, they can rein-
corporate in another jurisdiction without liquidation) only by unanimous decision, which 
makes these transactions almost impossible in the case of widely held companies. This was 
also the case for Luxembourgish companies until a recent amendment of the general compa-
ny law.83 Greek public limited companies can reincorporate abroad by deciding with quali-
fied majority;84 additionally, dissenting shareholders are protected through the right of with-
drawal from the company.85 In Greek private companies, on the other hand, a unanimous de-
                                                 
81 Código das Sociedades Comerciais (Commercial Companies Act) Decree-Law No. 76-A/2006, as amended, 
article 3 (5). 
82 For French private companies see Code de Commerce article L 223-30, while for French public companies 
see Code de Commerce article L 225-97 (unless abilateral treaty exists with the country of destination);  
83 See Luxembourg Commercial Companies Act 1915: article 119 for private companies and article 67-1 for 
public companies, as amended by the act n. 167/2016, 10.08.2016, article 45 and article 98 (in public companies 
the required majority is 2/3 of the votes cast, while in private companies the majority os ¾ of the votes cast). 
84 Act 2190/1920, articles 29-31. 
85 Act 2190/1920, article 49(a). 
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cision is required.86 Despite statutory rules in these jurisdictions explicitly allowing domestic 
companies to change the lex societatis without liquidation, the procedure to implement out-
bound reincorporations is not regulated or only partially regulated. Therefore, the risk arises 
that companies are cancelled from the register of the jurisdiction of origin before they are 
registered in the commercial register of the new jurisdiction. Finally, as we have mentioned 
above, the Belgian regime allows domestic companies to re-incorporate abroad,87 but the 
procedure for the implementation of this decision is not regulated at all. 
Other jurisdictions clearly regulate reincorporations through detailed rules on the internal de-
cision-making process and the registration procedures. These countries are: Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Malta and Spain. These jurisdictions show how legislation on 
cross-border reincorporations can be drafted in order to take into account the interests of all 
stakeholders and to address all procedural issues. In all of these countries, reincorporations 
require a supermajority decision of the shareholders to transfer the registered office or statu-
tory seat abroad. One reason for an explicit legal instrument regulating reincorporations is the 
need to protect minority shareholders from risks related to a change of the lex societatis. As 
we have already seen, the most common strategies to protect minorities are supermajority or 
high quorum requirements and withdrawal rights of dissenting shareholders. In all Member 
States with comprehensive legislation on reincorporations,88 the decision to reincorporate has 
to be taken by the general meeting of shareholders by supermajority.89  
Some of the Member States with a comprehensive regulation of cross-border reincorporations 
grant a right to withdraw from the company to dissenting shareholders.90 In this respect, it is 
worth noting that a withdrawal right is also granted to dissenting shareholders by the legisla-
tion of some of the Member States that allow reincorporations without comprehensively 
regulating this operation (Greece for public companies and Portugal) and by the Italian re-
                                                 
86 Act 3190/1955, article 38(3)(a). 
87 Article 112 Belgian Private international law act (Loi portant le Code de droit international privé, 16 July 
2004). 
88 Curiously, Czech companies can decide to transfer their statutory seat abroad without triggering a change of 
company law; these companies are cancelled from the Czech company register, despite their keeping the Czech 
lex societatis, with the consequence that such a transfer is only feasible if the country of arrival accepts that a 
domestically registered company is governed by a foreign law: Act 125/2008 (Transformation Act). 
89 Cyprus: ¾ of attending shareholders (Companies Act article 354L, as amended by the act 24(I)/2006, and 
article 135); Czech Republic: this decision should be approved by 3/4 of attending shareholders (Sections 17 
and 21 Transformations Act). Denmark: 2/3 of attending shareholders (Companies Act, s. 106). Malta: unless 
more stringent requirements are provided in the articles of association (a) for public companies 75% in nominal 
value of the shares represented and entitled to vote at the meeting and at least 51% per cent in nominal value of 
all the shares entitled to vote at the meeting; (b) for private companies 51% in the nominal value of the shares 
conferring that right (Subsidiary Legislation 386.05, Continuation of Companies Regulation 26th November, 
2002, at 13 and Companies Act 1996, art. 135). Spain: (a) for private companies the majority required is 2/3 of 
their capital; (b) for Public companies the majority depends on the number of shareholders attending the 
meeting (½ of voting shares if 50% or more of voting capital attended the meeting, or 2/3 of voting shares if 
between 25% and 50% of shares with voting capital attended the meeting (Ley 3/2009, sobre modificaciones 
estructurales de las sociedades mercantiles, No 3/2009, hereinafter ‘Structural Modification of Companies Act’, 
art. 97).  
90 Denmark: companies act 2009, as amended, s. 16a; Spain: Structural Modification of Companies Act, art. 99. 
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gime, which we will analyse in the third group of countries. By contrast, other jurisdictions 
that allow reincorporations (Greece for private companies, France and Luxembourg) require 
that this decision is to be taken unanimously, which can be considered as a functional equiva-
lent of shareholders’ withdrawal right.  
Most of the regimes that comprehensively regulate reincorporations explicitly govern the 
procedure for cancelling a domestic company from the local register, thus avoiding that the 
company is cancelled before it is registered in the new jurisdiction. Finally, Member States 
having detailed regulations on cross-border conversions in place also provide for adequate 
creditor protection mechanisms, mostly based on a right of creditors whose claims occurred 
before the initial plan to reincorporate was made public to object to the reincorporation91 or 
request a security.92 The Danish regime is based on the creditors’ right to file their claim or 
require a security, unless an independent expert officially declares that creditors are suffi-
ciently protected.93 Interestingly, the Cyprus and Maltese regimes require that the directors of 
emigrating companies issue a solvency statement in which they declare that ‘they are not 
aware of any circumstances that could negatively influence the solvency of the company 
within a period of three years.’94 
(b) Jurisdictions in which voluntary outbound reincorporations are either not allowed or 
are practically impossible  
If we look at national regimes as they operate in practice, we can see that, despite the most 
recent decisions of the Court of Justice in Cartesio and VALE, several jurisdictions still pro-
hibit or make impossible outbound reincorporations. These countries are: Croatia, Hungary, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom. As a matter of fact, companies 
incorporated in these countries cannot relocate their statutory seat or registered office abroad 
and cannot reincorporate under the law of a different Member State without prior liquidation.  
It is worth considering the position of the UK,95 which is to be contrasted with other common 
law jurisdictions, such as Cyprus and Malta. The leading case is Gasque v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners, where Macnaughten J stated clearly that companies cannot have a domicile 
of choice, by stressing that ‘[t]he domicile of origin, or the domicile of birth, using with re-
                                                 
91  Cyprus: Companies Act article 354M; Malta: Continuation of Companies Regulation at 15(2); Spain: 
Structural Modification of Companies Act, art. 100. 
92 Czech Republic: Transformation Act, s. 35 and s. 59u. 
93 Danish Companies Act, Chapter 16a. 
94 For Cyprus see The Companies Law Cap. 113, s 354K. The language used by the Maltese Companies Act 
(art. 13(b)(i)) is almost identical: ‘a declaration […] confirming the solvency of the company and confirming 
that the directors are not aware of any circumstances which could negatively affect in a material manner the 
solvency position of the company within a period of twelve months’. 
95 This paper has been drafted without considering the effects of the referendum on the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom from the European Union, which was held on 23 June 2016 and in which the majority of voters 
decided to leave the EU. At present, the outcome of negotiations between the UK government and the 
governments of the other 27 Member States is still unpredictable. At this stage, it cannot be excluded that the 
UK will completely retreat from the single market, in which case the freedom of establishment would no longer 
be applicable to their companies and to EU-based companies that aim at moving into the UK.  
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spect to a company a familiar metaphor, clings to it throughout its existence’.96 Therefore, 
even when an English company decides to reincorporate in another jurisdiction, it cannot 
simply be struck off the register for this reason and, if the country of arrival accepts its regis-
tration according to domestic law, under the viewpoint of English law a new company exists, 
which is entirely separate from the original English entity.97 Additionally, even if courts were 
to accept the position that, in the aftermath of Cartesio, English law cannot unilaterally pro-
hibit domestic companies from converting into entities governed by the law of another Mem-
ber State,98 it would remain uncertain how reincorporations would be implemented in prac-
tice.  
In Ireland, whose approach regarding the lex societatis is identical to the approach adopted in 
England and Wales,99 the impact of the Cartesio ruling has been debated in light of possible 
amendments to Irish company law. In particular, the government entrusted a group of experts, 
the Company Law Review Group, with assessing the impact of ECJ case law on Irish regime 
prohibiting reincorporations.100 The Company Law Review Group maintained that the Carte-
sio decision is binding regarding voluntary outbound reincorporations, so that barriers against 
this decision posed by the country of origin violate freedom of establishment under the Trea-
ty unless they serve overriding requirements in the public interest. Therefore, the Company 
Law Review Group recommended to introduce provisions that allow cross-border conversion 
in the new companies act. However, such changes were not implemented when the new stat-
ute was eventually adopted in 2014.  
The Polish regime is also interesting. On the one hand, art. 19(1) of the Polish Private Inter-
national Law Act maintains that transfers of seat within the EEA do not result in the loss of 
legal personality; on the other hand, a shareholders’ resolution on relocation of the statutory 
seat is treated akin to a liquidation decision (arts. 270(2) and 459(2) Commercial Company 
Act). As a consequence, Polish companies that seek to reincorporate abroad must pay all their 
debts and liquidate all assets and the entire business, but this does not lead to a loss of their 
legal personality, which continues after their re-registration in the country of arrival. It goes 
without saying that this is akin to making reincorporations impossible in practice.101  
                                                 
96 Gasque v Inland revenue commissioners [1940] 2 KB 80 at 84. See also National Trust Company v. Ebro 
Irrigation & Power Ltd. [1954] DLR 326; International Credit and Investment Co v. Adham [1994] 1 BCLC 66. 
97 Re Irrigation Company of France Ltd (1871) LR 6 Ch App 176; A Farnsworth, The residence and domicile of 
corporations (Butterworth: 1939) 222; PS Smart, ‘Corporate Domicile and Multiple Incorporation in English 
Private International Law’ (1990) Journal of Business Law 126; Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of 
Law (Sweet and Maxwell: 2012) at para. 30-003. This policy choice was renewed recently, when the company 
law reform of 2006 did not implement the proposal made by the Company law steering group to allow identity 
preserving company law changes. See Company law steering group, completing the structure, 2000, URN 
00/1335, 11, 54 and Final Report, 2001, chapter 14 
98 See E Ferran, ‘Corporate Mobility and Company Law’ (2016) 79 Modern Law Review 813 at 830. 
99 See Kutchera v Buckingham International Holdings Ltd [1988] 1 IR 61, 68 
100 CLRG Sixth Report 2010-2011, par. 6.2.1. available at www.clrg.org/publications/clrg-sixth-report-2010-
2011.pdf  
101 As we shall see in the final section of this paper, the compatibility of the Polish regime with the Treaty will 
be addressed by the Court of Justice when it will decide on the case C-106/16, Polbud v Wykonawstwo sp. 
z.o.o., which concerns a Polish company seeking to reincorporate in another Member State. 
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With regard to the Hungarian regime, it is interesting to note that Hungarian companies still 
cannot, as a practical matter, reincorporate abroad, with little discussion of the direct applica-
bility of the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the Treaty in Cartesio. Regarding Romania, in 
2014 a decision of the Court of Appeal of Brasov rejected a request for reincorporation to the 
UK on the basis of two arguments: first, that case law of the Court of Justice (Cartesio in par-
ticular) did not provide any clear guideline regarding the procedure for reincorporations and 
no specific rules had been adopted in Romania; second, that the specific company that sought 
to reincorporate in the UK did not provide evidence that all formalities had actually been ful-
filled in the country of arrival.102 
(c) Jurisdictions that do not explicitly regulate voluntary outbound reincorporations 
In several Member States, neither statutory law, nor judge-made law address outbound rein-
corporations. In most of these jurisdictions (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Slovenia and 
Sweden) it is still not clear whether domestically incorporated companies can actually rein-
corporate abroad by way of a transfer of statutory seat, but in some of them an increasing 
awareness of the impact of EU law on freedom of reincorporation is emerging.103 Among le-
gal systems without an explicit regulation, we should analyse two groups of countries in 
which this issue has been largely debated, although with partially diverging solutions: on the 
one hand, Austria, Germany and the Netherland, and, on the other hand, Italy.  
In the former group of jurisdictions, outbound reincorporations by way of transfer of a com-
pany’s statutory seat abroad were traditionally prohibited. In Germany, for instance, which 
until Centros represented the most significant case of a consistent application of the ‘real seat’ 
theory, a decision to transfer the statutory seat of domestic companies abroad would be seen 
as void,104 while older case law even interpreted it as a decision to liquidate the company.105 
Nevertheless, Austrian, German and Dutch commentators accept, in light of the decisions 
Cartesio and VALE of the Court of Justice, that voluntary outbound reincorporations into 
other EU Member States must be allowed as a matter of EU law, although a considerable de-
gree of uncertainty exists regarding their procedural requirements, as well as creditor and 
                                                 
102 Court of Appeal Brasov, No. 910/2014, 6528/62/2013, at: http://legeaz.net/spete-drept-comercial-curtea-de-
apel-brasov-2014/plangere-impotriva-rezolutiei-directorului-orc-23-09-2014-g90 . 
103 It is worth mentioning the position of Estonia, where reincorporations are not regulated at all and it still 
unclear whether this transaction is feasible; as a matter of fact, however, Estonian companies are cancelled from 
the local register when they relocate their registered office abroad. In Slovenia, additionally, despite the absence 
of statutory rules in this respect, some academic scholars submit that such transactions should be made possible 
as a consequence of the Cartesio and VALE rulings; see Prostor, ‘Razdružitev statutarnega in dejanskega sedeža 
slovenske družbe’ (2014) Pravnik 1-2. 
104 See L Fastrich, in Baumbach & Hueck’s GmbHG (Munich: Beck 20th ed., 2013) s 4a, 9; ibid. See e.g. 
BayObLG 11 February 2004, in AG, 2004, 266; OLG München 4 October 2007, in ZIP, 2007, 2124. 
105 See B Grossfeld, Internationales Gesellschaftrecht, in Staudinger’s Kommentar BGB (DeGruyter: 1998) 
605; M-P Weller, ‘Zur identitätswahrender Wegzug deutscher Gesellschaften’ (2004) Deutsches Steuerrecht 
1218; L Fastrich, in Baumbach & Hueck’s GmbHG (Munich: Beck 20th ed., 2013) s 4a, 9; a complete analysis 
of case law can be read in A Frank, Formwechsel im Binnenmarkt (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016) 40 (with 
further references). See among others BGH, 21 March 1986, BGHZ 97, 334 and BayObLG 7 May 1992, 
BayOBLGZ, 1992, 113. 
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employee protection.106 In Austria and in the Netherland, the idea that domestically incorpo-
rated companies can voluntarily reincorporate abroad without liquidation in spite of the lack 
of statutory regulation does not seem to have been tested in court. A German court, by con-
trast, has recently maintained that cross-border outbound reincorporations from Germany 
have to be allowed despite the lack of any regulations, in the wake of the Vale decision of the 
European Court of Justice.107 Regarding Germany, it is worth remembering that, before the 
Cartesio and VALE decisions, legal practitioners had developed another procedure for the 
transfer of the seat of a German company abroad: the German company converts into a part-
nership – a GmbH & Co KG with a newly formed foreign corporation as one of the partners 
– followed by a withdrawal of all German partners from the partnership with the result that 
all assets of the partnership accrue to the foreign shareholder.108 However, it does not seem to 
be the case that this happens frequently in practice, presumably, due to the complex tax im-
plications of such a conversion of a company to a partnership.109 In the Netherlands, on the 
other hand, although companies seem to prefer entering into cross-border mergers, reincorpo-
rations abroad are not infrequent and practitioners have developed a standardised procedure 
based upon the application, by way of analogy, of the rules on cross-border mergers and do-
mestic conversions.110 Furthermore, a draft bill is being discussed by the Dutch Parliament 
and is likely to be approved soon.111  
                                                 
106 For Austria see e.g. N Adensamer and G Eckert, ‘Umzug von Gesellschaften in Europa, insbesondere 
Wegzug österreichischer Gesellschaften ins Ausland’ (2004) Gesellschaftsrecht 52; G Eckert, Internationales 
Gesellschaftsrecht (Vienna: Manz 2010) 564. For Germany, see e.g. W Bayer and J Schmidt, ‘Grenzüberschrei-
tende Sitzverlegung und grenzberschreitende Restrukturierungen nach MoMiG, Cartesio und Trabrennbahn’ 
(2009) 173 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 735; J Hushahn, ‘Grenzüberschreitende 
Formwechsel im EU/EWR-Raum – die identitätswahrende statutenwechselnde Verlegung des Satzungssitzes in 
der notariellen Praxis’ (2014) Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 137 at 142-9; G Janisch, Die grenzüberschreitende 
Sitzverlegung von Kapitalgesellschaften in der Europäischen Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015) 293; Frank 
(n 105) 174 – 257 (suggesting application of most rules on national conversions by way of analogy, provided 
that companies also relocate a genuine link to the host state). For the Netherlands see M Zilinsky, ‘Cartesio: 
zetelverplaatsing en de vrijheid van vestiging’ (2009) WPNR 6787, 153-4; A Stroeve, ‘Het VALE-arrest en de 
‘inbound’ grensoverschrijdende omzetting in Nederland’ (2013) Tijdschrift voor de Ondernemingsrechtspraktijk 
72. 
107 OLG Frankfurt a.M., 03.01.2017 - 20 W 88/15 (conversion of a German GmBH into an Italian srl). See C 
Teichmann ‘Grenzüberschreitender Formwechsel kraft vorauseilender Eintragung in Aufmahmestaat? (2017) 
ZIP, forthcoming (criticizing both the registration of the company in the Italian register, without all pre-
requisites, and the acceptance of such registration by the German court). Another case of reincorporation (from 
Germany to Austria) is reported by K Jennewein, ‘Grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung einer deutschen GmBH 
nach Österreich’ Der Gesellschafter (2016) 277. 
108 R Ege and S Klett, ‘Praxisfragen der grenzüberschreitenden Mobilität von Gesellschaften’ (2012) Deutsches 
Steuerrecht 2442 at 2446; C Teichmann, ‘Die Auslandsgesellschaft & Co.’ (2014) 32 Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 220 at 223; Frank (n 105) 58. See Hans Brochier Holding Ltd v. Exner 
[2006] EWHC 2594. 
109 Based on Umwandlungssteuergesetz (UmwStG), s 14. 
110 The procedure is regularly applied and the intention for conversion is disclosed in the Staatscourant; see 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/zoeken/staatscourant.  
111  Draft bill 12 January 2012, available at 
www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2012/01/12/wetsvoorstel-grensoverschrijdende-omzetting-
van-kapitaalvennootschappen. 
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Finally, Italian law represents a fairly distinct position. Italian companies are explicitly al-
lowed to transfer their ‘statutory seat’ (sede legale) abroad by way of a supermajority deci-
sion of the general meeting amending the articles of association,112 and dissenting or absent 
shareholders have the right to withdraw from their company.113 Furthermore, the Italian Pri-
vate International Law Act stipulates that any transfer of the statutory seat is effective only if 
both conflict and substantive rules of all States involved are respected.114 Therefore, the Ital-
ian regime seems to be more in line with countries that allow reincorporations without clari-
fying, or without fully clarifying, the details of this procedure, such as France or Belgium 
(which we have classified under the second group of countries). According to Italian private 
international law regime, however, companies are governed by the law of the State in which 
the formation procedure was fulfilled.115 Consequently, several judicial decisions and local 
offices of the commercial register maintain that Italian companies cannot change their lex so-
cietatis and that a transfer abroad of a company’s statutory seat is only effective if it does not 
trigger a change of applicable company regime.116 The practical application of these rules, 
however, is not univocal and other local offices of the commercial register simply strike off 
domestically incorporated companies after a decision to relocate their statutory seat, without 
inquiring whether the company has actually been re-registered in the commercial register of 
the country of arrival. 117 It is worth mentioning, however, that an increasing number of 
scholars,118 judicial decisions119 and local offices of the company’s registrar120 maintain that, 
                                                 
112 Public companies (societa’ per azioni): at first call, quorum and majority are ½ of the legal capital; at second 
call, the quorum is 1/3 of the legal capital, while the majorityis 2/3 of represented capital; at third call, the 
quorum is 1/5 of the legal capital and the majority is 2/3 of represented capital; however, in ‘closed’ public 
companies (ie, not listed nor widely held), the majority of votes in favour to the reincorporation should also 
correspond to at least 1/3 of the whole capital (Codice civile, article 2369). Private companies (società a 
responsabilità limitata): quorum and majorities ½ of the legal capital (Codice civile art. 2379-bis(3)) 
113 Codice civile, article 2347, for public companies, and article 2473 for private companies. See M Ventoruzzo, 
‘Cross-border Mergers, Change of Applicable Corporate Laws and Protection of Dissenting Shareholders: 
Withdrawal Rights under Italian Law’ (2007) 6 European Company and Financial Law Review 47.  
114 Act No. 218/1995, Italian Private International Law Act, article 25(3) 
115 Act No. 218/1995, Italian Private International Law Act, article 25(1).  
116 See Corte d’Appello Trieste 9.10.1999, (2000) 54 Rivista del notariato 167; Corte di Cassazione 23.1.2004, 
n. 1244 (on which see F Mucciarelli, ‘The Transfer of Registered Office and Forum Shopping in International 
Insolvency Cases: an Important Decision from Italy’ (2005) 4 European Company and Financial Law Review 
512). Among legal scholars see D Damascelli, I conflitti di legge in materia societaria (Bari: Cacucci 2004) 
131. This is probably one of the reasons why Fiat Chrisler Automotive reincorporated as a Dutch entity by way 
of a cross-border merger. See F Pernazza, ‘La mobilità delle società in Europa, da Daily Mail a Fiat Chrysler 
Automotive’ (2015) 29 Diritto del commercio internazionale 439. 
117 This risk is not trivial, as the cases Interedil and VALE, both related to the ‘emigration’ of Italian companies, 
clearly show. The Interedil case will be addressed thoroughly in section 6.1.  
118  T Ballarino, Diritto internazionale privato (Padova: Cedam 3d ed. 1999) 360; MV Benedettelli ‘Sul 
trasferimento della sede sociale all’estero’ (2010) 55 Rivista delle società 1264; FM Mucciarelli, Società di 
capitali, trasferimento all’estero della sede sociale e arbitraggi normativi (Milan: Giuffrè 2010) 174-8. 
119 Tribunale Monza 5.4.2002, (2003) 30 Giurisprudenza commerciale, II/558; Tribunale Torino 10.1.2007, 
(2007) 159 Giurisprudenza Italiana, 1679. 
120  The most significant example is the Milan branch of the Commercial Register: 
www.mi.camcom.it/web/guest/trasferimenti-di-sede-all-estero-e-dall-estero. Interestingly, this commercial 
register accepts that local companies relocate their statutory seat to another EU Member State and decide to 
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in the wake of Cartesio and Vale, Italian companies should be allowed to change the applica-
ble law without liquidation, by transferring their statutory seat abroad, provided that the 
country of arrival accepts this change and that its rules are respected. The situation is, there-
fore, still uncertain, but scholars and practitioners seem to be increasingly aware of the im-
pact on domestic law of most recent decisions of the Court of Justice.  
 
5. VOLUNTARY INBOUND REINCORPORATIONS IN THE EU 
5.1. Policy and legal issues 
Cross-border reincorporations should also be analysed from the viewpoint of the country 
whose law the company seeks to adopt. The legal and policy issues that arise from that Mem-
ber State’s perspective often mirror those addressed by the State of original incorporation. 
Thus, most Member States that allow outbound reincorporations also allow the inbound con-
version of foreign companies into domestic ones. A few exceptions do however exist. 
The preliminary question is whether private international law and substantive rules of the 
country of arrival allow foreign companies to convert into domestic companies without liqui-
dating in the State of origin and by ensuring continuity of their legal personality. One ap-
proach is, of course, simply to prohibit inbound reincorporations. In this case, when a foreign 
company decides to transfer its statutory seat or registered office and re-register in the do-
mestic company register as a local company, this decision would – at most – be regarded as 
the decision to register a new company, which is neither the ‘same legal person’ as the origi-
nal company, nor its legal successor.121 Therefore, from the standpoint of the incoming coun-
try, no debts and credits, and no contracts – including employment contracts – of the former 
company are transferred to the newly registered company. Furthermore, shareholders would 
need to make contributions to the company’s capital according to domestic substantive com-
pany law. Alternatively, the commercial registers of Member States that do not accept ‘in-
bound reincorporations’ may simply register a domestic branch or an establishment of a for-
eign company, even though that company sought to re-register under the new law. In both 
cases, if the emigrating company was cancelled from the register of the original State of in-
corporation, while the State of arrival did not accept inbound reincorporations, the company 
would ‘disappear’ from any company register in the EU without being officially liquidated, 
as already mentioned above. From a EU law standpoint, however, a complete prohibition of 
inbound reincorporations violates freedom of establishment as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice in the VALE ruling.  
The State of origin, where the company is incorporated at the moment when the decision is 
taken, is also normally competent to determine the relevant substantive and procedural re-
quirements (such as majorities for approving the reincorporation decision). Nevertheless, we 
cannot exclude that the State of arrival also seeks to regulate substantive law issues. In any 
                                                                                                                                                       
keep the Italian lex societatis; these companies, therefore, continue to be registered in the Milan office of the 
register, which ‘fictively’ considers the original ‘statutory seat’ as the actual seat for registration purposes.  
121 See PS Smart (n 97) 126. 
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case, the State of arrival is certainly competent to regulate the registration procedure. In other 
words, the question arises of which procedural steps immigrating companies should follow to 
register in the company register as the continuation of an already existing company instead of 
a newly founded one. 
 
5.2. Comparative analysis 
Our findings indicate that, in practice, Member States still follow different solutions regard-
ing inbound reincorporations, despite the decisions of the Court of Justice in VALE. In most 
cases, rules on inbound reincorporations reflect those on outbound transactions, but we shall 
see that exceptions exist. Member States can be classified along the same dimensions that 
were adopted for outbound reincorporations, according to whether (a) inbound conversions 
are statutorily allowed and regulated, (b) inbound conversions are not allowed or practically 
impossible, or (c) inbound reincorporations are not explicitly regulated, the consequences of 
the lack of regulation are still unclear, yet scholars and court are increasingly of the opinion 
that companies incorporated in another EEA country should be allowed to reincorporate as 
domestic companies, despite the lack of rules. The classification of Member States in these 
classes largely, although not entirely, mirrors the classification related to voluntary outbound 
reincorporations 
(a) Jurisdictions that allow and regulate inbound reincorporations  
While some countries allow inbound reincorporations without regulating the procedural and 
substantive rules of this transaction (Belgium and Portugal), other jurisdictions have explicit-
ly allowed and regulated inbound reincorporations in the same legislative instrument that 
governs outbound reincorporations (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Malta and Spain). In 
particular, inbound reincorporations are feasible only if the country of origin allows domestic 
companies to reincorporate abroad and if the immigrating company has complied with both 
substantive requirements and private international law provisions of that country. Therefore, 
commercial registers will enter an incoming company only if it has complied with the rele-
vant laws of both the country of origin and the country of arrival. In some jurisdictions, a no-
tary statement (Czech Republic) 122, a statement of the competent authority (Denmark)123 or a 
specific declaration of the immigrating companies (Cyprus)124 must be attached to the filing 
with the local register attesting that the relocation complies with the law of the country of 
origin. Additionally, under Spanish legislation, in order to protect creditors of the incoming 
company, an independent expert should state that the net value of assets is at least equal to 
                                                 
122 The notary attests to the satisfaction of the requirements of Czech law for registration in the commercial 
register and to having seen the instrument issued by the competent authority of the country of origin, proving 
compliance with the requirements of that law for the cross-border conversion of the legal form. See Czech 
Transformation Act, s. 59z and s. 384d 
123 Danish Companies Act s. 318n. 
124 The Companies Law Cap. 113, art. 354C. 
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the Spanish minimum capital requirements (this provision is applicable to both EEA and non-
EEA countries).125  
Another issue that needs to be addressed in proceedings for inbound reincorporations is the 
cancellation from the commercial register of the country of origin. As we have seen above 
regarding outbound reincorporations126, according to both the SE Regulation and the Cross-
Border Merger Regulation, the ‘emigrating’ company can be cancelled from the original reg-
ister only after its registration in the country of arrival. After registration and before cancella-
tion, therefore, the company is registered in two registers at the same time. From the view-
point of the state of arrival, the question arises as to whether a domestic authority should send 
a statement of registration to the commercial register of the country of departure and whether 
it should check that the company is cancelled from the register of the original country. Cypri-
ot, Maltese and Danish regimes deal with these issues. In Cyprus and Malta, an ‘immigrating 
company’ is registered only temporarily, and is required to submit evidence of its removal 
from the companies register of origin within 6 months; only after this submission can the (fi-
nal) certificate of continuation be issued.127 In Denmark, the local register (DBA) should 
send a statement to the authority of the State of origin, attesting that the company was regis-
tered as a Danish company.128 
(b) Jurisdictions in which inbound reincorporations are either not allowed or are practi-
cally impossible 
Other Member States have not adopted legislation on inbound reincorporations and, as a mat-
ter of practice, inbound reincorporations remain either impossible or excessively difficult 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and the UK). These countries, addi-
tionally, do not distinguish EEA from non-EEA companies. This policy option normally mir-
rors the ban on ‘outbound reincorporations’ in the same country and is either based on gen-
eral private international law criteria (Ireland and the UK) or lack of regulation (Bulgaria and 
Romania). For instance, Romanian legislation does not mention inbound reincorporations, 
and a court of appeal decision from 2008, concerning the attempt of an Italian company to re-
incorporate as a Romanian entity, held that these transactions were not allowed.129 However, 
this issue is controversial and legal scholars argue that EEA companies should be allowed to 
reincorporate under Romanian law without liquidating and that domestic law should be re-
formed in order to comply with the VALE decision.130 Given that these countries provide for 
the possibility of a domestic company to convert into another type of business organisation, 
the restrictive approach of the countries in this group is in breach of the freedom of estab-
                                                 
125 Structural Modification of Companies Act 3/2009, art. 94. 
126 See section 3.1, above. 
127 For Cyprus: The Companies Law Cap. 113, art. 354G. For Malta: Continuation of Companies Regulation 
2002, s. 6. 
128 Danish Companies Act s. 318n. 
129 Court of Appeal Bucarest No 1060/2008. 
130 M Şandru, ‘Libertatea de stabilire a societăţilor comerciale. Posibile efecte ale cauzei VALE, C-378/10, 
pendinte, asupra practicii instanţelor române’ (2012) Revista Rômana de Drept European 124. 
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lishment, as interpreted in VALE, if it continues to be applied to foreign companies incorpo-
rated in the EEA.131  
(c) Jurisdictions that do not explicitly regulate voluntary inbound reincorporations  
In several other Member States where inbound reincorporations are not regulated, the inter-
pretation of domestic law might be uncertain, ranging from countries that accept inbound re-
incorporations by applying case law of the Court of Justice to countries in which this issue is 
unclear or has not yet been addressed. In all of these countries, however, scholars and courts 
show, albeit to different degrees, an increasing awareness of the impact Court of Justice’s de-
cisions on inbound reincorporations.  
In Austria and Germany, case law has recently started accepting that inbound reincorpora-
tions should be allowed despite the lack of legislation. In Austria, the Supreme Court has re-
cently clarified that inbound reincorporations from other Member States are possible and that 
rules on domestic conversions should be applied.132 Additionally, in light of Austrian private 
international law, the ‘immigrating’ company must also relocate its headquarters onto the 
Austrian territory. In Germany, a recent judicial decision has maintained that inbound rein-
corporations are to be allowed and that rules on national conversions should be applied by 
way of analogy.133 This approach followed by Austrian and German courts is largely driven 
by the decisions of the Court of Justice in VALE, but some uncertainty still remains regarding 
which procedure is to be followed for reincorporating a foreign company domestically. Final-
ly, in Luxemburg and Slovenia, no judicial decision has been issued so far, but legal scholars 
argue that inbound reincorporations should be allowed as a consequence of Cartesio and VA-
LE.134 
The situation is more uncertain in other jurisdictions, although scholars often submit that in-
bound reincorporations are to be made possible by virtue of an application of VALE. In 
France, the lack of statutory regulation still raises uncertainty as to the procedure that foreign 
companies have to fulfil in order to re-incorporate as French entities. In Hungary, where 
‘outbound reincorporations’ are still impossible, inbound reincorporations are considered fea-
sible by applying the ratio decidendi of the VALE decision (which was related to a company 
that sought to reincorporate in Hungary).135 In Italy, although it is accepted that foreign com-
panies can relocate their ‘statutory seat’ onto the domestic territory, provided that both Italian 
substantive rules and the rules of the country of origin are respected,136 it is uncertain wheth-
                                                 
131 P Davies and S. Worthington, Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 10th ed. 
2016) 142. 
132 See OGH, judgment of 1 August 2014, 6 Ob 224/13d.  
133 OLG Nürnberg (2014) Deutsches Steuerrecht 812: a Luxembourgish private company (Sarl) sought to 
transfer its statutory seat, together with its headquarters, to Germany in order to become a German private 
company (a GmbH). See Frank (n 105) with further references to previous cases deciding in the negative. 
134 For Luxembourg see A Steichen, Précis de droit des sociétés (Saint-Paul: 2014) 4th ed., n° 82. For Slovenia 
see J Prostor, ‘Razdružitev statutarnega in dejanskega sedeža slovenske družbe’ (2014) Pravnik 1-2. 
135 However, it is worth mentioning that the Hungarian Supreme Court, in its task of applying the VALE 
decision, refused registration of the Italian company as a Hungarian entity for lack of compliance with 
Hungarian law: EH 2013.02.G3. 
136 Italian Private International Law Act, Article 25(3). 
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er such a relocation leads to a change of company law.137 In this respect, Italian notaries seem 
to accept inbound reincorporations, mostly so in the aftermath of the VALE decision, provid-
ed that the incoming company has respected Italian substantial and procedural rules.138 Final-
ly, the Polish regime is similar to the Hungarian regime, since legal scholars hold that in-
bound reincorporations should be made possible after the VALE decision, whereas, as we 
have seen above, legal scholars are divided regarding outbound reincorporations, which are 
likely not to be feasible and, in any event, require full liquidation of a company’s assets. It is 
interesting to note, therefore, that both in Hungary and Poland the VALE decision is held di-
rectly applicable, whereas the position in relation to the statement in Cartesio, according to 
which outbound reincorporations must also be allowed, is far less clear, probably reflecting 
the uncertain binding force of this part of the Cartesio ruling.  
 
6. RESTRICTIONS TO REINCORPORATIONS: DISCUSSION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
AND A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE 
6.1. Discussion of the comparative analysis 
As a consequence of the analysis conducted hitherto, the question arises of whether obstacles 
placed by national regimes to reincorporations are compatible with the EU freedom of estab-
lishment, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in the cases Cartesio and VALE. With regard 
to outbound voluntary reincorporations of domestic companies, the answer largely depends 
on whether the obiter dictum in Cartesio, according to which obstacles to outbound reincor-
porations are to be treated as restrictions to the freedom of establishment, is viewed as the 
correct interpretation of the Treaty. Our findings indicate that several Member States have 
not brought their domestic law in line with the interpretation of the Treaty in Cartesio and 
still prohibit voluntary outbound reincorporations. By contrast, as we have seen above,139 in 
three countries (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) that formerly prohibited outbound re-
incorporations, the prevailing view among legal scholars is that – even without explicit legis-
lative reform – such transactions should now be regarded as being available to domestic 
companies by virtue of the relevant Treaty provisions as interpreted by the Court in Cartesio. 
Even so, many technical and procedural questions still remain unclear, as Cartesio does little 
more than declaring that outbound reincorporations constitute an exercise of the freedom of 
establishment.  
With regard to ‘inbound’ voluntary reincorporations, by contrast, the VALE decision clarified 
that (a) the absence of rules laid down in secondary European Union law is not a precondition 
                                                 
137 See, e.g., R Luzzatto and C Azzolini, ‘Società (nazionalità e legge regolatrice)’ in Digesto delle discipline 
privatistiche sezione commerciale (Torino: UTET 1997), 136, 153; Damascelli (n 116) 135-136 (relocation in 
Italy is possible without change of company law); Ballarino (n 118) 372 (a relocation of statutory seat may lead 
to a reincorporation as an Italian company); Benedettelli, ‘La legge regolatrice delle persone giuridiche dopo la 
riforma del diritto internazionale privato’ (1997) Rivista delle società 39 at 98-103 (stressing the necessity to 
check what companies aim at attaining and what is being allowed by the regime of the country of origin). 
138 See www.consiglionotarilemilano.it/documenti-comuni/prassi-registro-imprese/prassi_09.aspx. 
139 See section 4.2 (c), above. 
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for the application of the freedom of establishment,140 (b) where equivalent domestic restruc-
turings are permitted, more onerous rules for ‘inbound’ reincorporations require full justifica-
tion, that is to say they should be appropriate for attaining overriding reasons in the public in-
terest and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain them,141 and (c) domestic rules of 
the host states should comply with the general principles of equivalence and effectiveness.142 
It is clear that Member States cannot completely prohibit inbound reincorporations or render 
them practically impossible. Nevertheless, as we have seen, several Member States still im-
pede, or severely restrict, the possibility of foreign companies to convert into domestic enti-
ties. 
Even where reincorporations are generally allowed, their practical availability crucially de-
pends on the applicable procedural rules. In several Member States the procedure is regulated 
insufficiently or is not regulated at all. From a practical perspective, a particularly relevant 
question concerns the process by which the domestic register of the country of origin deregis-
ters the emigrating company. In Member States where this issue is not regulated, there is a 
significant risk that a company is struck off the register of the country of origin without being 
registered yet in any other commercial register and having acquired its status under the law of 
the destination country. As registration is typically a prerequisite for a company possessing 
legal capacity, uncertainty regarding this process – which will require a certain level of coop-
eration between judicial or administrative authorities across Member State borders – poses a 
significant risk for businesses wishing to reincorporate. The decision rendered in the case In-
teredil is a telling example of this problem:143 an Italian company decided to transfer its 
statutory seat to London and the local register cancelled the company without checking 
whether the company was registered in the English register as a domestic company. Interedil, 
however, was only registered by the UK’s Companies House as an ‘overseas’ company hav-
ing a ‘place of business’ in England, not least since inbound reincorporations are not current-
ly possible under English law – notwithstanding the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice dis-
cussed above. As a consequence, after its cancellation from the Italian register, Interedil was 
not registered anywhere as a domestic company: the Italian register believed that this compa-
ny had become a UK entity, while its record with the Companies House suggested it was still 
an entity existing under Italian company law. Interedil thus shared the fate of VALE Építési 
kft. 
Some Member States (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Malta and Spain), by contrast, 
have decided to explicitly allow reincorporations and to precisely regulate these transactions. 
In these countries, the proceedings and substantial requirements for reincorporating abroad 
are often similar to those foreseen in cross-border mergers. In particular, companies can be 
cancelled from the domestic register only after they prove being registered under a foreign 
commercial register. 
                                                 
140 VALE (n 43) [38], quoting Sevic [26]. 
141 VALE (n 43) [36] and [39], quoting Sevic [28, 29]. 
142 VALE (n 43) [48]. 
143 C-396/09 Interedil Srl, in liquidation v Fallimento Interedil Srl and Intesa Gestione Crediti SpA [2011] ECR 
I-9915. See FM Mucciarelli, ‘The Hidden Voyage of a Dying Italian Company, from the Mediterranean Sea to 
Albion’ (2012) 9 European Company and Financial Law Review 571. 
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6.2. A new submission for a preliminary ruling from a Polish court 
This paper has shown that several Member States restrict or even prohibit cross-border rein-
corporations. This issue is much more relevant regarding voluntary outbound reincorpora-
tions of domestic companies, due to the need of protecting minority shareholders and credi-
tors from the risk that the new company law rules are less protective of their interests. In this 
respect, the Court of Justice held in Cartesio that any restrictions on outbound reincorpora-
tions should be justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. However, as we have 
seen above, the scope of this holding is still partially unclear. The question of whether free-
dom of establishment includes a right to change the applicable company law without liquida-
tion will be addressed by the Court of Justice when it will deliver its judgement on the re-
quest for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Polish Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) in 
February 2016.144 It is worth, therefore, briefly to summarise the content of the questions 
submitted to the Court of Justice and the related problems. 
The starting point is a decision of a Polish company, Polbud, to relocate its statutory seat to 
Luxembourg and to convert into a Luxemburgish company, under the new name Consoil Ge-
otechnik S.à.r.l.. The Polish Private International Law Act (art. 19(1)) stipulates that transfers 
of companies’ ‘seats’ within the EEA area do not result in the loss of legal personality; the 
concept of ‘seat’ is commonly interpreted as a company’s registered office or statutory seat. 
The Polish Commercial Company Act, however, treats a shareholder resolution on relocation 
of the statutory seat akin to a liquidation decision.145 In other words, after a decision to relo-
cate its seat abroad, a company would keep its legal personality, but its assets are to be liqui-
dated and creditors are to be satisfied. As a consequence, Polbud, after its decision to transfer 
its statutory seat to Luxembourg, formally entered into a liquidation procedure, which was 
considered a precondition for a cross-border reincorporation.  
Two years later, the company was entered in the Luxembourgish register under its new name 
and filed an application to be cancelled from the Polish register. The Polish registry court, 
however, refused to cancel Polbud, claiming that it did not provide sufficient evidence of 
having completed the liquidation process. 146 Polbud challenged this decision and the case 
eventually reached the Polish Supreme Court, which referred three preliminary questions to 
the Court of Justice. In the first place, the Court is asked to clarify whether the freedom of es-
tablishment precludes a Member State from requiring liquidation of a reincorporating com-
pany before it is removed from the relevant national register. Secondly, if the first question is 
answered in the negative, the Polish court asks whether such a liquidation requirement could 
be seen as a justified restriction in relation to the aim of safeguarding ‘creditors, minority 
shareholders, and employees of the migrant company’. Finally, the Court is required to clari-
fy the concept of establishment for the purpose of article 49 of the Treaty; the reason is that 
Polbud had declared that its commercial activities would remain in Poland, which raises the 
                                                 
144 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 22 February 2016, C-106/16, 
Polbud v Wykonawstwo sp. z.o.o. 
145 Art. 270(2) and 459(2) Commercial Company Act. 
146 See the whole description in Opinion AG Kokott (nt. 55) [13]-[19]. 
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question as to whether a company’s decision to reincorporate without relocating its estab-
lishment would fall within the scope of article 49 TFEU. 
The first two questions are crucial, since the Polish regime does not regulate the procedure of 
cross-border reincorporations, so that creditors may be left unprotected. In this respect, the 
main policy problem seems to be that, while a conversion of a Polish company into another 
Polish entity would require this company to comply with a large number of information and 
protection requirements, companies migrating abroad would be exempted entirely from the 
application of any requirements if the liquidation procedure was not applicable, considering 
that Polish courts refuse to apply the protection mechanisms of domestic conversions to the 
cross-border context by way of analogy.  
Finally, the Court is asked to address the concept of ‘establishment’ for the purpose of apply-
ing article 49 and 54 of the Treaty. The decisions VALE and Cadbury Schweppes maintained 
that the concept of establishment ‘involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity through 
a fixed establishment in the host Member State for an indefinite period’, with the conse-
quence that the country of arrival can examine whether the incoming company ‘is seeking to 
establish a lasting economic link’ with its territory.147 It is however uncertain whether the 
same logic also applies to the country of emigration. Therefore, the Polish court has submit-
ted to the Court of Justice the question of whether ‘a situation in which […] a company trans-
fers its registered office to another Member State without changing its place of principal es-
tablishment, which remains in the State of initial incorporation’ falls within the scope of the 
EU freedom of establishment.148 The Polish court seems to envisage the possibility that the 
country of origin is given the same authority as the country of arrival. It is clear that the 
Member State of immigration can refuse the incorporation of a company if it does not pursue 
any business activity in its own territory (provided the same requirement applies to domestic 
companies). This authority of the state of incorporation was acknowledged as early as Daily 
Mail, and it is in line with the definition of establishment as espoused in VALE and other cas-
es, since the mere act of registration of a company arguably does not amount to ‘the pursuit 
of genuine economic activity’.149 The referring Polish court now seems to argue that even if 
the state of immigration allows the registration of the migrating company without any eco-
nomic activity and the company keeps its ‘actual’ or ‘fixed’ establishment in the state of 
origin, the process of reincorporation may fall outside the scope of the right of establishment 
as no 'fixed establishment' is relocated, provided the state of origin, were it the immigration 
state, would refuse to register a company that did not pursue any economic activity in that 
country.150  
                                                 
147 C‑196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I‑7995, paragraph 54; VALE 
(n 43) [34]. 
148 Polbud question n. 3. 
149 VALE (n 43) [34]. 
150 This seems to be the case under national Polish company law, see A Szajkowski in S Sołtysiński, A 
Szajkowski, A Szumański, J Szwaja (eds), Kodeks spółek handlowych t. II, Spółka z ograniczoną 
odpowiedzialnością, Komentarz do artykułów 151-300 (3rd edn, C.H. Beck 2014) 83; A Kidyba, Kodeks spółek 
handlowych t. I, Komentarz do artykułów 1-300 (9th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2013) 648. 
31 
 
In May 2017, Advocate General Kokott issued her opinion in Polbud.151 Rephrasing the ques-
tions and addressing the third question first, she pointed out that it had to be assessed whether 
Polbud’s decision to reincorporate in Luxembourg fell within the scope of the right of estab-
lishment, before it could be asked whether Polish law unnecessarily restricted that free-
dom .152 Whether Polbud actually aimed not to relocate any ‘establishment’ to Luxembourg 
was a merely factual question, which was to be decided by the local courts. Regarding the in-
terpretation of EU law, the Advocate General concluded that a cross-border reincorporation 
without any ‘genuine economic activity’ in the country of arrival did not fall within the scope 
of freedom of establishment, with the consequence that the country of origin could block 
such a decision.153 This interpretation was not seen to be in conflict with Cartesio or Centros.  
The Advocate General argued that the former decision could not ‘be taken to mean that the 
Court regarded cross-border conversions as falling within the scope of freedom of establish-
ment irrespective of any actual act of establishment’.154 The present case was distinguished 
from Centros because the latter did not involve ‘the consecutive application of two national 
laws’.155 The Advocate General, therefore, seems to suggest that in a static case, such as Cen-
tros, a genuine establishment in any Member State is sufficient to invoke the protections of 
the right of establishment in that state (Denmark in Centros), whereas in a dynamic case in-
volving a change in the applicable law, the establishment must follow the applicable national 
law.156 
The Opinion then addressed the first two questions, stating that (a) the need to liquidate a 
company in order to reincorporate abroad was a restriction of the freedom of establishment,157 
and (b) such a restriction was neither necessary nor proportionate to protect creditors and mi-
nority shareholders. 158 Interestingly, the Opinion implicitly suggests that national legislators 
or, failing an explicit statutory regulation, national courts by way of analogy may apply less 
restrictive mechanisms to attain the goal of protecting such stakeholders. In this regard, the 
Opinion explicitly mentioned that creditors might be given the right to request specific safe-
guards, similarly to domestic mergers,159 and that minority shareholders could be protected by 
way of granting them the right to withdraw their participation from the company.160 
For the purpose of this paper, it is to be stressed that, even in the wake of a final decision of 
the Court clarifying that freedom of establishment also protects voluntary outbound reincor-
porations, the ‘law in action’ of Member States would not, as such, necessarily change, and 
certain jurisdictions might continue not to provide any specific procedure for implementing 
cross-border reincorporations in a detailed and interoperable way, with the consequence that 
                                                 
151 Opinion AG Kokott (nt. 55). 
152 Opinion AG Kokott (nt. 55) [25]. 
153 Opinion AG Kokott (nt. 55) [38]. In a similar vein see: Frank (n 105) 65 – 72 and 146 – 149. 
154 Opinion AG Kokott (nt. 55) [40]. 
155 Opinion AG Kokott (nt. 55) [42].  
156 This, of course, would constitute a qualification of Centros, since in that case there was no congruence 
between applicable law (English) and genuine establishment (in Denmark). 
157 Opinion AG Kokott (nt. 55) [48]. 
158 Opinion AG Kokott (nt. 55) [66]. 
159 Opinion AG Kokott (nt. 55) [60]. 
160 Opinion AG Kokott (nt. 55) [62]. 
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these operations may well remain impracticable in many Member States. A possible solution 
could be for national courts to apply by analogy – guided by principles stated in the European 
case law – the harmonised procedural and substantive rules for cross-border mergers or trans-
fers of registered offices of SEs. Yet, no one can be certain that such interpretation is going to 
be widely accepted by national courts and authorities, which may well face constraints on 
their ability to create ad hoc a procedural framework for reincorporations, based only on the 
fact that these operations fall within the scope of the freedom of establishment. This is a situ-
ation that several Member States already experience regarding inbound reincorporations, as 
we have seen in the former sections, and we can expect the same will happen regarding out-
bound reincorporations, for which political problems are even more pronounced. In these 
countries, therefore, two different issues would emerge. On the one hand, there is a problem 
of legal certainty as companies would still not be aware of how the procedure for reincorpo-
rations would work in practice. On the other hand, outbound reincorporations may create 
risks for creditors and other stakeholders and a lack of regulation would simply jeopardise 
their interests. The consequence is that, in order to make the right to reincorporate effective 
from the perspective of both the country of origin and the country of arrival, a legislative in-
strument should be in place that clarifies the procedure for cancelling a company from the 
original register and re-registering it in the new register and the mechanisms for protecting 
minorities and creditors. 
 
6.3. The essential elements of a future directive 
Reincorporations from one jurisdiction to another can only be implemented when procedural 
and substantive rules are in place in both jurisdictions that make this operation possible. 
Since Member States should implement these rules in a way that accommodates the structure 
and substance of their domestic company laws and national commercial registers, the instru-
ment of a directive seems more appropriate for the aim of harmonising rules on reincorpora-
tions.161 Additionally, Member States retain the power to require domestically incorporated 
companies to keep some kind of ‘physical’ connection to their territory, such as their head-
quarters, their activities or administrative offices. Indeed, according the Court of Justice, 
these requirements for domestically incorporated companies fall into what can be labelled a 
                                                 
161  Other academic proposals have addressed cross-border reincorporations, and yet none of them has 
analytically touched upon substantive and procedural issues: (a) Geman commission for private international 
law (Vorschläge und Berichte zur Reform des europäischen und deutschen internationalen Gesellschaftsrechts. 
Vorgelegt im Auftrag der zweiten Kommission des Deutschen Rates für Internationales Privatrecht, 
Spezialkommission Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht) edited by HJ Sonnenberger, 2007, art. 2 – 7; (b) The 
‘Reflection Group on the future of EU company law’ is a group of academics from different Member States, 
which was established in December 2010 by the European Commission; see Report of the Reflection Group on 
the Future of Company Law in Europe, Brussels, 5 April 2011 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf ) at 18; (c) Groupe 
européen de droit international privé (GEDIP) Proposal 2015, www.gedip-egpil.eu/present_eng.html: See: F 
Garcimartín-Alférez, ‘The law applicable to companies in the European Union. A proposal othe European 
Group for Private International Law’ (2016) available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2857077.  
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‘reserved area’ for Member States’ legislation.162 A directive on cross-border reincorporation 
will set a minimum standard for protecting minority shareholders, creditors and employees 
from opportunistic midstream changes of company law.163 To attain these goals, it is suggest-
ed that such a directive should have the following essential features in order to make cross-
border conversions feasible and to take into account the interests of all stakeholders. 
First, in order to reincorporate abroad, companies need to be struck off the initial public reg-
ister and entered in the public register of the destination Member State. Thus, companies 
should first decide to ‘relocate’ their statutory seat (or their registered office) to the new ju-
risdiction. This explains why most legislative proposals for a 14th directive and recent resolu-
tions of the European Parliament refer to the transfer of a company’s ‘registered office’ or to 
the need to harmonise and clarify rules on the transfer of a company’s ‘seat’.164 Yet, a deci-
sion to amend the articles of association and to ‘relocate’ the registered office does not trigger 
per se a reincorporation abroad. In order to achieve this effect, a company must also show the 
intention to change the lex societatis and, consequently, must file for cancellation from the 
original register and for registration in the public register of the new country. It seems thus 
more appropriate and clear that a new directive will address any situation in which a compa-
ny decides, by own volition, to change applicable company regime, rather than just the trans-
fer of companies’ registered office or statutory seat (which is just an element of this transac-
tion). However, it is also worth stressing that most EU legislative instruments are implicitly 
based on the assumption that registered office (or statutory seat) and applicable law always 
coincide.165 Thus, it is advisable that a reform avoids diverging interpretations at the national 
level and any ambiguities as to the consequences of a decision to relocate a company’s statu-
tory seat on the applicable law. 
Regarding the internal decision-making process to implement voluntary outbound reincorpo-
rations, we have seen that in all jurisdictions that allow these operations the ultimate decision 
is for the general meeting of the company’s shareholders.166 A decision to ‘reincorporate’ 
abroad is a fundamental decision, which is reasonable being adopted with at least the same 
quorum and majority needed for amending the articles of association, or for converting a 
company into another type of domestic company. Such quorums and majorities are legal 
safeguards for protecting minority shareholders from opportunistic midstream changes of 
                                                 
162 The Court in Cartesio explains that ‘the question whether the company is faced with a restriction on the free-
dom of establishment, within the meaning of Article [49 TFEU], can arise only if it has been established, in the 
light of the conditions laid down in Article [54 TFEU], that the company actually has a right to that freedom’: 
Cartesio (n 35) [109]. 
163 See LA Bebchuk, ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate 
Law’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 1437 at 1485-91. 
164 See section 3.3, above. 
165 See e.g. First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968, Directive 2007/37/CE on shareholders’ rights, 
or Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover-bids. 
166 This is also the solution adopted for cross-border mergers (Cross-Border Merger Directive, Art. 9), the SE 
(SE Regulation, Art. 8(4)) and the European Cooperative Company (Council Regulation (EC) 1435/2003 on the 
Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE) art. 7. 
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company regime.167 To attain this goal, it is desirable that the new directive establishes a 
minimum majority requirement based on votes cast, similarly to the SE Regulation.168 Quor-
ums and majorities, however, cannot be more stringent than those applicable to similar do-
mestic transactions. Finally, it seems advisable that a mandatory protection of classes of 
shares is included in the new directive. Quorums and supermajorities, however, risk not being 
sufficient for protecting minority shareholders when shares’ ownership is concentrated and 
the emigrating company does not face pressures from the capital market.169 In order to ad-
dress this risk, all Member States that statutorily allow outbound reincorporations, with the 
sole exception of the Czech Republic, grant to dissenting shareholders either a right to with-
draw their participation or a veto power through unanimous vote.170 While unanimous vote 
would make reincorporations impossible and is to be excluded, the question arises of whether 
the new directive should codify a withdrawal right. On the one hand, withdrawal or appraisal 
rights are elements of company law regimes, and each Member State is likely to be in the 
best position to assess whether minority shareholders of domestically incorporated companies 
need this type of protection.171 On the other hand, one of the policy goals of EU legislation 
should be avoiding opportunistic regulatory arbitrages at the expenses of local weak constitu-
encies, in order to create the environment for a sound regulatory competition among national 
company law regimes; therefore, it seems desirable that a directive on reincorporations also 
increases the protection for dissenting shareholders, by including dissenting shareholders’ 
withdrawal right, which is, as we have seen, the common denominator of almost all Member 
States that statutorily allow reincorporations. However, in order to allow Member States to 
adjust protection of dissenting shareholders to domestic necessities and policy purposes, it 
seems appropriate to allow Member States to opt-out from such a mechanism.  
Protecting pre-existing creditors of the company, as well as other stakeholders, is one of the 
main problems of outbound reincorporations and the main reason why several jurisdictions 
are restrictive towards reincorporations.172 Member States that have detailed regulations on 
                                                 
167 Se J Armour, ‘Who should make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition’ (2005) 58 
Current Legal Problems 369 at 400. 
168 SE Regulation, art. 8(6) and art. 59: relocations of a SE’s registered office should be approved by at least 2/3 
of votes cast. The Cross-Border Merger Directive, by contrast, only provides that Member States may adopt 
provisions ‘designed to ensure appropriate protection for minority members who have opposed the cross-border 
merger’. Cross-Border Merger Directive, Art. 4(2). 
169 TH Tröger, ‘Choice of Jurisdiction in European Corporate Law – Perspectives of European Corporate 
Governance’ (2005) 6 European Business Organisation Law Review 3 at 40. 
170 In economic terms, such protection indicates that the country of incorporation aims at protecting each 
shareholder individually through a right to ‘exit’ from the ‘nexus of contracts’ that binds all stakeholders 
Lombardo, ‘Regulatory competition’ (n 37) 647. 
171 See Impact Assessment 2007 (n 78) 48 (discouraging harmonisation of shareholders’ protections) In this 
regard, see M Siems, ‘The Case Against Harmonisation of Shareholder Rights’ (2005) 6 European Business 
Organization Law Review 539. 
172 According to the SE Regulation, the Member State of original incorporation should provide for adequate 
protection, while the Cross-Border Merger Directive implicitly refers to the Third Directive on domestic 
mergers, according to which Member States should provide ‘adequate safeguards where the financial situation 
of the merging companies makes such protection necessary and where those creditors do not already have such 
safeguards’. Additionally, the SE Regulation and the SCE Regulation do not allow relocations of a company’s 
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cross-border conversions in place also provide for adequate creditor protection mechanisms, 
mostly based on the right to object to the reincorporation. As a first option, the new directive 
may replicate the solution of the SE Regulation173 by stating that Member States should pro-
vide for ‘adequate protection’ of creditors, without any further specification. This solution is 
likely to increase the level of creditor protection in Member States that do not provide for any 
mechanisms aimed at attaining this goal, but it risks being quite vague and uncertain. It is, 
therefore, advisable increasing the level of creditor protection mechanisms by requiring 
Member States to grant pre-existing unsecured creditors at least a right to object to the rein-
corporation, or, alternatively, to obtain adequate security or payment, and that a court should 
assess whether the reincorporation is detrimental to creditors. Creditors, indeed, are the class 
of stakeholders that risk being jeopardised the most by a cross-border reincorporation, with-
out having any powers to influence such decision (with the sole exception of ‘adjusting’ cred-
itors, such as banks and other big lenders). Additionally, in order to avoid opportunistic rein-
corporations decided after a company’s insolvency or in the vicinity of insolvency, a new di-
rective should prohibit reincorporations of companies against which proceedings for liquida-
tion, insolvency or suspension of payments have been brought.  
Furthermore, it matters that in some Member States, employees can appoint a certain number 
of members of the supervisory board or of the board of directors (‘codetermination’).174 
Therefore, reincorporations out of these countries risk disenfranchising the employees if the 
new state of incorporation does not have similar mechanisms. To address this risk, the Di-
rective on employee involvement accompanying the European Company (SE) Statute and the 
Cross-Border Mergers Directive175 establish mandatory legal frameworks aimed at protecting 
existing employee participation arrangements. A new directive, therefore, should consider 
applying those mechanisms to reincorporations as well. 
Finally, a new directive should address procedural requirements for companies wishing to re-
incorporate, which are often uncertain under the national laws of the Member States involved. 
The main procedural problem arising for reincorporations is the coordination of actions taken 
by the relevant companies registers, as legal personality is typically tied to registration. The 
risk exists that the company register of the country of origin strikes off a company before it 
‘reappears’ in the destination country. In this respect, the SE Regulation, the SCE Regulation 
and the Cross-Border Merger Directive stipulate that (a) Member States should designate a 
court, notary or other authority, which shall scrutinise the legality of the transaction and issue 
a certificate attesting the completion of acts and formalities to be accomplished in the country 
or origin; (b) this certificate should be submitted to (i) the commercial register of the new 
registered office of an SE or SCE, or (ii) the court, notary or authority designated by the 
Member State of the company resulting from a cross-border merger; (c) the new registration, 
                                                                                                                                                       
registered office abroad if proceedings for ‘winding-up, liquidation, insolvency or suspension of payments or 
other similar proceedings’ have been brought. SE Regulation Art. 8(15) and SCE Regulation Art. 7(15). 
173 SE Regulation, art. 8(7). 
174 For an overview of employee participation regimes see www.worker-participation.eu. 
175 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001, supplementing the SE Regulation, Art. 4(4). The same 
mechanism is to be applied to cross-border mergers, although with some adaptations: Recital 13 and Art. 16 
Cross-Border Merger Directive. 
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or the registration of the company resulting from a cross-border merger, may not be affected 
until this certificate has been submitted; (d) when the new registration has been affected, the 
registry shall notify the commercial register of the jurisdiction of origin, or of the jurisdiction 
where the companies entering into a cross-border merger are registered; (e) a company can be 
deleted from the commercial register of the original country only after its name is entered in 
the commercial register of the new Member State, or the company resulting from a cross-
border merger is registered in the Member State where its registered office is situated.176  It is 
suggested that a solution for regulating cross-border reincorporations should replicate these 
rules.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have analysed one of the most relevant and unresolved issues related to the 
EU’s freedom of establishment, namely whether companies formed under the law of a Mem-
ber State can decide to reincorporate under a different jurisdiction without liquidation. In this 
respect, we clarified that the common term ‘corporate mobility’ risks being misleading, since 
productive factors or a company’s headquarter might continue being located in the country of 
origin. A cross-border reincorporation only aims at changing the State having law-making 
power over ‘company law’ issues, namely primarily, though not exclusively, a company’s in-
ternal affairs. It goes without saying that if the country of the original incorporation protects 
creditors and other stakeholders through ‘company law’ rules, a decision of reincorporating 
abroad is politically very contentious. This explains why several Member States prohibit or 
severely restrict voluntary reincorporations of domestic companies into entities governed by 
the law of other states.  
In this scenario, the question arises as to whether the freedom of establishment also covers a 
right to reincorporate across Member States and, consequently, whether Member States 
should grant domestically incorporated companies the possibility of reincorporating under the 
law of a different jurisdiction and foreign companies the possibility of converting into domes-
tic entities without liquidation. The answer is still unclear, despite recent decisions of the 
Court of Justice. In particular, as we have seen, the Cartesio ruling of 2008 indicates that 
Member States cannot prohibit cross-border reincorporations when internal conversions are 
allowed instead. Strictly speaking, however, this statement was just obiter dictum, which 
probably explains why many Member State have ignored it.  
Regarding restrictions to inbound reincorporations, the VALE decision maintained that any 
restriction placed by the country of arrival should be proportionate and reasonable. The Court, 
however, also added that the concept of ‘establishment’ refers to the ‘actual pursuit of an 
economic activity through a fixed establishment’, with the consequence that midstream 
changes of company law are protected by the freedom of establishment only when the com-
pany also transfers some physical premise into the Member State of arrival and establishes a 
‘genuine economic activity’ there. Consequently, the VALE decision indicates that EU law 
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does not protect ‘free choice’ of company law, while Member States are of course free to al-
low companies to reincorporate even though no activity is transferred across the borders. 
Furthermore, this paper has engaged in a comparative analysis of all Member States regimes 
regarding outbound and inbound reincorporations. We have described whether and under 
which conditions domestic companies can, in practice, reincorporate abroad and whether for-
eign companies can convert into domestic entities without being previously liquidated. Our 
analysis has shown that, while some Member States have thoroughly regulated cross-border 
reincorporations, most Member States either have not regulated this issue at all, or only pro-
vide for partial and incomplete rules.  
In those Member States without any explicit rules on reincorporations, or with partial and in-
complete rules, the ‘law on the books’ needs to be supplemented by scholarly interpretations, 
judicial decisions or notary authorities. In comparative terms, this is an intriguing natural ex-
periment for assessing the impact of national legal cultures and mind-sets on the construction 
of domestic legal regimes. For instance, both Austrian and German lawyers argue that EU 
law, after the Cartesio and VALE decisions, mandates Member States to allow cross-border 
reincorporations and that, as a consequence, domestic law should be interpreted and applied 
accordingly, even though no explicit provision exists for implementing midstream changes of 
company law. By contrast, in other Member States that likewise have no explicit rules on re-
incorporations, scholars and practitioners either argue that a domestic legislation is necessary 
to make reincorporations possible, or simply ignore this issue.  
As a consequence, from the standpoint of several Member States, outbound and inbound re-
incorporations are, as a matter of fact, not feasible, despite the Cartesio and VALE rulings. 
This situation will probably not change even if the Court of Justice should explicitly decide 
that voluntary outbound reincorporations are covered by the freedom of establishment. This 
confused situation could give rise to opportunistic reincorporations at the expenses of credi-
tors or other stakeholders. As we have seen above analysing the Interedil case,177 when the 
involved Member States do not provide for any reincorporation proceeding, or when their 
rules are confused, companies might be cancelled from the commercial register of the coun-
try of origin without being entered in any register of other Member States.  
Based on this comparative analysis, we have argued in favour of EU harmonisation of rules 
and proceedings on reincorporations. At the same time, this directive should not harmonise 
private international law criterions and should leave Member States free to require domesti-
cally incorporated companies to keep some kind of ‘physical’ connection to their territory. 
Thus, a new directive should concern the procedural requirements that domestic companies 
should meet when they decide to reincorporate under a different jurisdiction or when foreign 
companies aim at converting into a domestic entity. Additionally, since outbound reincorpo-
rations might jeopardise creditors, minority shareholders and other stakeholders (such as 
workers when the country of origin follows some form of codetermination), the new directive 
should provide for a minimum harmonisation of mechanisms aimed at protecting these cate-
gories of company’s stakeholders. In this respect, although it is reasonable that such harmoni-
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sation effort would only set minimum requirements, we also argued that Member States 
should not be entirely free to decide on the content of these protection mechanisms.  
A common set of substantive and procedural rules on cross-border reincorporations has be-
come a necessity in the EU. On the one hand, several Member States ban reincorporations or 
make them impossible, regardless of case law of the Court of Justice, thus highlighting a se-
vere mismatch between national regimes and EU law. On the other hand, other Member 
States allow domestically incorporated companies to change the applicable company law 
without liquidation, but only few of these jurisdictions provide for clear rules for protecting 
stakeholders and avoiding the risk that ‘emigrating’ companies disappear from any commer-
cial register of the EU. In this confused situation, creditors and other stakeholders suffer 
widespread risks of being damaged through opportunistic reincorporations or through reloca-
tions of registered office without a real intention of reincorporating abroad. In this scenario, 
without clear and common rules, which take into account the interests of all constituencies 
and address all procedural issues raised by decisions of reincorporating abroad, Member 
States will have good reasons for increasingly closing their borders and rejecting companies’ 
mobility.  
 
 
